9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

firm on the line of my authority being required for any strikes by non MND(SE) forces

in my Area of Operations. Given the mass of legitimate family, religious, trade etc

links across a largely unpoliceable border, there is a real potential for second and

third order consequences from blanket anti‑Iranianism … I am not confident in our

ability to avoid miscalculation …”255

476.  The British Embassy Washington reported that they had picked up significant

concerns within the US system that lawlessness was rife in Basra and that the UK

military were doing little to confront it.256 The US was particularly concerned about

the need to counter Iranian influence and militia control and feared that an early

UK drawdown would leave a security vacuum.

477.  After reading the Embassy’s account, Mr Blair commented:

“Either this is correct in which case we have a real problem, or it isn’t in which case

we must correct it. But what is going on in Basra?”257

478.  On 24 January, Sir Nigel Sheinwald discussed the UK’s plans with Mr Hadley.258

He explained that UK Ministers were about to make important decisions on Iraq and

Afghanistan in the light of the results of Op SINBAD.

479.  The expectation was that it should be possible for the UK military to withdraw

from central Basra and to draw down from 7,000 to 4,500 troops. Sir Nigel “made clear

that this would be conditions‑based” but added that “if we were not able to reduce our

strength in Basra, we would not be able to increase in Afghanistan”.

480.  When Mr Hadley did not raise US objections, Sir Nigel concluded:

“… the White House is not opposed to our plans, and that the concerns within the

US system either have not reached the White House or do not seem sufficiently

significant to the White House to warrant their raising a flag”.

481.  On 25 January, Ambassador Khalilzad gave an interview to the BBC.259 He praised

the British as “great allies” but made clear that the US preference was “the longer we

stay together here, the better”.

482.  Mr Browne provided Cabinet with an update on military operations in southern Iraq

on 25 January.260 He said that Op SINBAD had been an important part of the strategy for

improving security in Basra, which remained significantly better than elsewhere in Iraq.

255  Minute Shaw to CJO, 24 January 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 24 January 2007’.

256  Letter Baker to McDonald, 24 January 2007, ‘Basra: US Views’.

257  Manuscript comment Blair on Letter Baker to McDonald, 24 January 2007, ‘Basra: US views’.

258  Letter Sheinwald to Forber, 24 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.

259  BBC News, 25 January 2007, MOD dismisses Iraq policy ‘split’.

260  Cabinet Conclusions, 25 January 2007.

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