The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
688.
The paper
entitled ‘Iraq: The Next Six Months’ described UK objectives
as:
“– a smooth
transition of executive power on 1 July to a sovereign Iraqi
transitional
government
that is regarded domestically and internationally as
legitimate:
– a
Security Agreement which allows Multinational Forces the freedom
they need to
operate,
but which does not look like an extension of the Occupation
…
– UN
Security Council endorsement of the above and an expanded UN
role.
– an
improving economy and infrastructure that will maximise the
prospects of a
successful
transition.”
689.
The main
challenges were agreeing how the TNA would be appointed, in a
manner
that Grand
Ayatollah al-Sistani would accept; defining the terms of Kurdish
autonomy;
and
securing Sunni engagement.
690.
On the first,
it was hoped that the UN’s assessment of whether elections
were
feasible
would help, but it also risked delaying the handover until the
autumn. On the
second, the
FCO judged that the Kurdish “bottom line will be that they will not
accept
less
autonomy than they have now. This should be
achievable.”
691.
Agreeing the
basis on which Coalition Forces would remain in Iraq after
handover
was
potentially an even larger problem.
692.
In a section
on ‘Security Structures’, officials identified that the key
challenge was
to ensure
“an agreement that gives Multi-National Forces the operational
freedom to
meet our
objectives, but offers the Iraqis sufficient sense of sovereignty
and strategic
input to
avoid alienating them and international opinion”. The paper noted
that:
“…
historical precedents are instructive.The UK tried and failed three
times to
conclude an
agreement for British forces in Iraq in the 1920s – each time
the
agreement
was undermined by nationalist demonstrations.”
693.
The paper
outlined that the UK and US agreed on “red line requirements” for
a
Security
Agreement, but identified differences, including that the US had
not taken on
board that
a number of multi-national partners would require Iraqi
consent/invitation and
UN
authorisation to be in place before they could confirm their
continued contribution
after
transition.
694.
The paper
identified the UK’s view of the key elements of the Security
Agreement as:
“– At the
invitation of the Iraqi government, Multi-National Forces will
continue
to be
present in Iraq, authorised by a UN resolution, to ensure stability
and
security.
For this they would require freedom of action in certain
definable
respects,
and the right to detain, to continue WMD investigations, and to
seize
intelligence
material.
320