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3.4  |  Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002
Iraqi regime cohesion
45.  Mr Scarlett advised on 31 July that Iraq considered a US attack to be likely.
46.  There was no intelligence of serious rifts within the regime and the perception
that senior members would be targeted by the US gave them no incentive to work
directly against Saddam Hussein.
47.  Some key members of Saddam Hussein’s regime were reported to favour
allowing inspectors to return.
48.  Popular uprisings would only be possible if there was a credible coalition
attack “with the clear intention of finishing off the regime”.
49.  On 31 July, Mr Scarlett provided a note “examining the weaknesses and sources of
friction within the regime”, in response to a request from Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s
Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec),
for more work on the cohesion of the Iraqi regime.16 As well as internal regime tensions,
which had been examined in the JIC Assessment of 4 July, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’,
and discussed in Mr Blair’s meeting of 23 July (see Section 3.3), Mr Scarlett addressed
military preparations and the attitudes of the Iraqi populace.
50.  Mr Scarlett wrote that the Iraqi regime considered a US attack to be “likely”; and it
saw the “greatest threat in the short term as coming from an ‘Afghanistan’ scenario of air
strikes and Special Forces supporting an internal uprising”. But Saddam Hussein was
“beginning to realise that a much larger US military operation” was “now possible”.
51.  The UK had no “intelligence suggesting any serious rifts within the senior members
of the regime”. There were differences within the Iraqi regime over permitting the return
of UN inspectors. Mr Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr al‑Hadithi, the Foreign
Minister, Mr Izzat Ibrahim al‑Duri, the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Council,
and Mr Uday Hussein, Saddam Hussein’s son, were “reportedly … more in favour”.
Mr Scarlett judged that policy differences were “unlikely to be a serious concern” for
Saddam Hussein: he totally dominated the regime and “despite any damage to his
prestige from allowing the return of inspectors” there was “little risk to him personally
from making sharp changes in policy”. He had “done so in the past” and his deputies
disagreed “at their peril”. It was “likely that senior members of the regime” judged
that “the US threat to topple the regime” would “include them”. There was “little or no
incentive for them to work directly against Saddam”.
52.  Conditions inside Iraq were better than they were “immediately before the start
of the Oil‑for‑Food (OFF) programme in late 1996”; but the “greatest losers under
sanctions” had been the middle classes. There was “no reliable information on public
opinion inside Iraq”, but a belief that the Iraqi population was “cowed by Saddam’s
security apparatus”.
16 Minute Scarlett to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘The Iraqi Regime: Risks and Threats’.
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