The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1187.
Mr Asquith
suggested a number of approaches to reduce the risk of Anbar
tribes
derailing
reconciliation efforts. They included support for an Executive
Council (through
which the
integration of militia groups should be managed), establishing
political tests
for the
militia to demonstrate support for the Iraqi Government, and
enforcing clear time
limits for
their existence before being disbanded or incorporated into the
IPS.
1188.
On 16 June,
Mr Asquith reported that he had discussed those proposals
with
Dr Mowaffak
al‑Rubaie, Iraqi National Security Adviser, at a meeting that day
and that
Dr al‑Rubaie
had agreed with the approach.1113
1189.
On 21 June,
Mr Asquith reported that the concept of an Executive Committee
was
“beginning
to take on substance with Maliki in receipt of a Presidency paper
setting out
how they
propose it should work to which he will respond”.1114
1190.
In his weekly
report on 24 June, Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, SBMR‑I
from
September
2006 to July 2007, wrote:
“An
increasing number of tribes, neighbourhoods, Sunni insurgents and
just local
people are
choosing to reject, occasionally terminally, AQ‑I. This is seen
particularly
in the
Southern Baghdad belts where, for example in one area there has
been an
80 percent
reduction in IEDs … This ‘people power’ is extending to Salah ad
Din,
Diyala,
Ninawa and of course is already in full effect in Al Anbar. In
smaller, but
notable
cases, we are seeing the same effect in Baghdad itself, so the
broader
‘awakening’
continues to make ground.”1115
1191.
On 4 July, a
DIS report stated:
“Central
government will remain extremely sceptical of Sunni tribal
initiatives in
provinces
with mixed sectarian demographics. The Shia‑dominated
government
fears these
could lead to the return of Sunni rule, and will ensure there
are
mechanisms
to minimise this risk.”1116
1192.
In his weekly
report on 6 August, Lieutenant General William Rollo, SBMR-I
from
July 2007
to March 2009, wrote that the Government of Iraq had accepted 1,700
former
Sunni
fighters in Abu Ghraib into the IPS.1117
That was
the first time that the government
had taken
steps to incorporate the Sunni militia from areas outside the Sunni
tribal
regions
into the MOI. Lt Gen Rollo described that as a “significant
concession by the
GOI
[Government of Iraq] … [and] potentially a major win that will
reassure other Sunnis
who have
come into the fold that the GOI genuinely intends to ‘see them
right’”.
1113 eGram
25998/07 Baghdad to FCO, 16 June 2007, ‘Iraq: Call on National
Security Adviser, 16 June’.
1114 eGram
26684/07 Baghdad to FCO, 21 June 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
1115 Minute Lamb
to Stirrup, 24 June 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (258) 24 June
07’.
1116 Report DIS,
[undated but stamped 4 July 2007], ‘Future Iraqi Security
Structures and Environment’.
1117 Minute
Rollo to CDS, 6 August 2007, ‘SBMR‑I’s Weekly Report (264) 6 Aug
07’.
332