The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
247.
Mr Blair wrote
on the minute from Mr Ricketts: “We must press on.”135
248.
In response to
the policy framework circulated by Mr Sawers on 7 March,
FCO
officials
prepared a draft letter for Mr Cook to send to Mr
Blair.136
The draft
letter stated:
“The key to
progress is smarter sanctions, which focus on tougher controls on
military
and
dual-use goods, while improving the scope for normal civilian
economic activity.”
Resolution
1284 would “remain on the table and we can offer some further
modest
concessions
along the lines discussed by officials … should Iraq comply (most
unlikely)”.
249.
Implementation
of those measures would require a new resolution: “We
should
pursue a
technical resolution which rebalances the controls on Iraq but does
not alter
the central
provisions of existing SCRs.”
250.
The draft
letter stated that the UK should continue to steer clear of “the
various
American
projects to overthrow Saddam”.
251.
The letter was
not sent by Mr Cook.
252.
Senior US and
UK officials met in Washington on 12 March to discuss
Iraq.137
Mr Westmacott
advised Mr Cook’s Private Secretary the following day that the
talks had
been
“pretty discouraging”. Mr Westmacott’s “tentative conclusions” from
the talks were:
•
on
sanctions, there appeared to be “some backtracking” within the
State
Department
from the “near identity” of views articulated by Secretary
Powell
and Mr Cook
at their recent meeting. On both oil smuggling and border
controls,
the US
appeared to favour “bilateral fixes” with the countries
neighbouring Iraq
rather than
action in the UN;
•
the US
appeared to be “a good deal more relaxed” than the UK about the
need
to restore
P5 unity; and
•
despite
showing some interest in the idea of a ‘Contract with the Iraqi
People’,
the State
Department appeared to be more relaxed than the UK on
the
presentational
aspects of policy.
253.
Mr Sawers
briefly discussed Iraq with a senior US official on 14
March.138
Mr Sawers
advised that US officials appeared to be retreating from the broad
policy
goals set
out by Secretary Powell. Mr Sawers stated that although
negotiations on
smarter
sanctions in the Security Council would be tricky, “it would be
difficult to
re-establish
political consensus on Iraq without it”.
254.
Ms Clare
Short, the International Development Secretary, and the Department
for
International
Development (DFID), were not included in the policy review and were
not
sent a copy
of Mr Sawers’ letter of 7 March.
135
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Ricketts to Sawers, 9 March 2001, ‘Iraq:
Impact of Smarter
Sanctions’.
136
Letter Cook
to Prime Minister, 9 March 2001, ‘Iraq: Future Policy
Framework’.
137
Minute
Westmacott to PS [FCO], 13 March 2001, ‘Iraq’.
138
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 14 March 2001, ‘Iraq’.
240