The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
693.
The JIC
Assessment of 19 April 2002 stated:
“… Iraq is
rarely perceived as the greatest security threat within the region.
Except
for Kuwait,
the Gulf States see Iran as the greater long-term security threat
and want
an
Iran-Iraq balance …”376
694.
The JIC
Assessment of 9 September 2002 judged that the use of chemical
and
biological
weapons before a military attack on Iraq was
“unlikely”.377
695.
The Executive
Summary of the dossier stated that intelligence
showed:
“… Saddam
Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of
mass
destruction
which he regards as the basis for Iraq’s regional power. It shows
that
he does not
regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use
them,
including
against his own population, and is determined to retain them
…”378
696.
The Executive
Summary also stated:
“But the
threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we
have
described.
It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of
Saddam
Hussein’s
regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression
gives
rise to
unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly
outlines
… Saddam’s
rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of
regional
aggression.
Saddam’s human rights abuses are also catalogued …”379
697.
Mr Powell
explicitly cautioned that, while Iraq had the means, the dossier
did
not
demonstrate that it posed an imminent threat. In his email to
Mr Scarlett on
17 September,
Mr Powell wrote that the dossier:
“… does
nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from
Saddam
In other
words it shows he has the means but it does not demonstrate he
has
the motive
to attack his neighbours let alone the west We will need to make
clear
in
launching the document that we do not claim to have evidence that
he is an
imminent
threat The case we are making is that he has continued to develop
WMD
since 1998,
and is in breach of UN resolutions The international community has
to
enforce
those resolutions if the UN is to be taken
seriously”.380
698.
Addressing
Mr Powell’s comments about the “imminent threat”,
Mr Campbell
replied
that was “why TB’s Foreword sets out ‘the case I am
making’”.381
376
JIC
Assessment, 19 April 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes’.
377
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons – Possible
Scenarios’.
378
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
5.
379
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
7.
380
Email
Powell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002, ‘Dossier’.
381
Email
Hatfield [on behalf of Campbell] to Scarlett and Powell, 17
September 2002, ‘Dossier’.
248