3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
146.
Dr Blix
stated that, to be effective, inspectors needed “immediate,
unrestricted and
unconditional”
access to sites; they needed information; and they needed skill.
Under
the
previous inspections regime there were relatively few problematic
inspections where
access was
denied. The burden of proof did not lie with the inspectors to
prove that
Iraq was
guilty. It was “for Iraq to restore confidence in the world that
they do not have
weapons of
mass destruction”.
147.
Dr Blix
pointed out that “an absence of evidence is not the evidence of
absence”.
148.
The FCO’s
further advice on the possible text of a draft resolution
judged
that an
ultimatum calling for the re‑admission of inspectors would be
“difficult
to secure”
but was “not out of reach”.
149.
If the
talks between Iraq and the UN about the return of inspectors
petered
out or
“better” broke down, that could provide a “trigger” for such a
resolution.
150.
The
objective was for a resolution which would provide legal cover
for
military
action, in the event of a refusal to comply with an ultimatum,
without
the need
for further action in the Security Council.
151.
Mr Straw
suggested that the UK dossier might be published via the
UN.
152.
Mr Rycroft had
commissioned further advice from the FCO on what a UN
ultimatum
would look like, and how it would be achieved, for Mr Blair’s
return to work in
late August
(see Section 3.3).51
153.
The FCO
advised No.10 on 27 August that it had “now done further work on
the
possibility
of a Security Council ultimatum to Iraq”, and that “President
Bush’s speech
to the UN
General Assembly on 12 September could be an important
curtain‑raiser.”52
An
ultimatum would be “difficult to secure” but it was “not out of
reach”. It would “need
a carefully
managed campaign during the early autumn” and “a great deal of work
in
P5 capitals”.
154.
Considering
tactics in the Security Council, the FCO advised that the UN/Iraq
“talks
petering
out, or, better, a definite breakdown due to Iraqi intransigence”
could provide a
“trigger”
for a resolution. If inspectors were allowed back into Iraq, “the
trigger could be a
report by
Blix on Iraqi non‑co‑operation”.
155.
The text of a
resolution would be “conditioned to some extent by the wider
context”.
There might
be “some political attractions … in tabling hard language” but,
“unless there
51
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Bush,
31 July’.
52
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 27 August 2002, ‘Iraq:
Ultimatum’.
121