10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
499.
Ministers
commented that the UK needed to consider transition in the wider
context
of the
legacy that the UK would leave behind in those
provinces.
500.
Ministers also
commented that it would not be possible to retain DFID
international
staff in
Maysan and Muthanna after transition. In practice, their
contribution was “useful
but not
vital” and infrastructure projects would continue. Civilian control
of both provinces
had been in
the hands of the Iraqis since the dissolution of the Coalition
Provisional
Authority
(CPA) and even without the transition, the intention was to focus
the
reconstruction
effort in the South on Basra and Dhi Qar. The security challenges
posed
by the
transition have a significant impact on other donors, including the
UN.
501.
DOP(I)
commissioned the MOD to produce a paper on the transition
reflecting
cross-departmental
concerns about the transition, “based on a robust assessment of
the
conditions
in the two provinces”.
502.
Dr Reid
presented that paper to DOP(I) on 15 February (see Section
9.4).289
503.
The MOD paper
recommended that both provinces should transition as soon
as
possible,
with the end of May as a target date.
504.
The MOD stated
that the withdrawal of coalition forces would reduce the
amount
of
development assistance that could be provided to Muthanna and
Maysan by the UK
and other
donors, and confirmed that DFID was “content with this, recognising
that their
existing
support is useful, but not essential, to provincial stability”. The
MOD continued:
“DFID will
encourage other donors (e.g. the Japanese) to ensure that
any
unfinished …
projects are completed before closure of permanent bases or
able
to be
completed by local staff and contractors in slower time, and that
plans for
operation
and maintenance of completed projects have been made … DFID
will
encourage
donors with large numbers of local staff (USAID, the UN) to
consider how
best they
could deploy these in Maysan and Muthanna to continue capacity
building
and
governance support.”
505.
Commanders in
MND(SE) were confident that they could facilitate travel by
FCO,
DFID and
international personnel into the provinces after
transition.
506.
The MOD
assessed that the UK’s legacy would be “considerable”.
ISF
development
was on track and would complete in October 2006. In
addition:
“UK support
has also helped Provincial Governments get on their feet.
Working
with
ministries in Baghdad, Provincial Councils are able to take
decisions, deliver
services,
manage budgets and work with donors at a basic level. They
are
functioning,
but fragile. Increased capacity and recent reforms may not
survive
political
rivalries and reduced levels of donor support. But in both
Provinces we have
289
Paper
Secretary of State [Defence], 14 February 2006, ‘Iraq: Handover of
Security in Maysan and
al Muthanna
Provinces’.
279