6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
At such a
meeting I would not have thought it necessary to repeat
arguments
already
made by others … unless there was some specific benefit in doing
so.”193
446.
In his Note
to President Bush of 28 July on the strategy on Iraq,
Mr Blair
suggested a
build‑up of military forces in the Gulf in the autumn as a signal
of
intent to
encourage international support and demoralise Iraq.
447.
Mr Blair’s
Note to President Bush on 28 July and his and Sir David
Manning’s
subsequent
discussions with President Bush are addressed in Section
3.3.
448.
Mr Blair’s
Note of 28 July began:
“I will be
with you, whatever. But this is the moment to assess bluntly the
difficulties.
The
planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not
Kosovo. This
is not
Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf War.
“The
military part of this is hazardous but I will concentrate mainly on
the political
449.
In a section
setting out the elements of a strategy to secure a political
coalition,
if not
necessarily a military one, Mr Blair wrote:
“It goes
without saying that the Turks and Kurds need to be OK. Strangely I
think
they are
going to be the easiest, despite the Turkish elections. They both
want our
help badly
and will play ball if offered enough.”
450.
In a section
headed “The Military
Plan”,
Mr Blair wrote:
“Finally,
obviously, we must have a workable military plan. I don’t know the
details
yet, so
this is first blush.
“The two
options are running start and generated start.
“The first
has the advantage of surprise; the second of overwhelming force.
My
military
tell me the risks of heavy losses on the running start make it very
risky.
Apparently
it involves around 15‑20,000 troops striking inside Iraq, with
heavy air
support.
The idea would be to catch the regime off balance, strike hard and
quickly
and get it
to collapse. The obvious danger is [that] it doesn’t collapse. And
there is
the risk of
CW being used.
“For that
reason, a generated start seems better. It could always be
translated into
a more
immediate option, should Saddam do something stupid. Also, the
build‑up of
forces in
such numbers will be a big signal of serious intent to the region
and help to
pull people
towards us and demoralise the Iraqis. This option allows us to
hammer
his air
defences and infrastructure; to invade from the South and take the
oilfields; to
193
Statement
Hoon, 2 April 2015, paragraph 13.
194
Note Blair
[to Bush], 28 July 2002, ‘Note on Iraq’.
243