3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
289.
During a
visit to Washington in mid‑December, Sir Richard
Dearlove
emphasised
the need for sufficient evidence to make a convincing case that
Iraq
had failed
to abide by resolution 1441.
290.
During a
discussion on 15 December, Sir Richard Dearlove told his
interlocutor
that his
impression from his meeting with Mr Blair on 11 December was
that “HMG
would need
clear evidence beyond an audit of the Iraqi declaration, to commit
to
291.
Sir Richard
reported a view that President Bush was relying on
Mr Blair’s
assurances
that HMG would be with the US.
292.
The report
sent to Sir David Manning recorded that Sir Richard had
discussed the
Iraq
declaration and the need for a “road map” setting out the next
steps with a number
293.
Sir Richard
had told one US official that, in addition to setting out clearly
and
persuasively
that Iraq had failed to abide by resolution 1441:
“… we
needed to continue on parallel tracks designed to reinforce the
case, and for
HMG, to
give the PM sufficient evidence of a breach which the declaration
by itself
did not. We
needed:
•
a detailed
audit of the declaration
•
to press
the interview issue or force Saddam’s refusal to
co‑operate
•
to prepare
for the release of intelligence to prove deception
•
to press on
with a rigorous inspection regime absent a
‘silver‑bullet’.”
294.
Sir Richard
had said that “perhaps by the end of January all those
elements
would have
produced sufficient evidence to make the convincing case we
needed”.
A
“convincing defector or a revealing site inspection” would be
preferable, “but we could
not depend
on this”. He added later that “success was far from
guaranteed”.
295.
In a separate
conversation with another official, Sir Richard Dearlove had
said that
he
“estimated the chance of a successful operation to produce a
defector or a smoking
gun at
about 20 percent”.
296.
In a
manuscript comment to Mr Blair, Sir David Manning wrote
that “we should
go flat
out” to find a defector or evidence in a site
inspection.98
96
SIS
Internal Record, 16 December 2002.
97
Letter PS/C
to Sir David Manning, 18 December 2002, ‘Iraq: C’s Discussions
in Washington
16‑17 December’
attaching Paper, ‘Iraq: C’s Discussion in Washington 16‑17
December’.
98
Manuscript
comment Manning, 18 December 2002, on Paper, ‘Iraq: C’s Discussion
in Washington
16‑17 December’.
53