10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
that the
Interim Strategy drew on the conclusions of the AHMGIR and
discussions with
other
departments and development agencies.
330.
The Interim
Strategy stated that the pledge made to the Iraqi people in the
‘Vision
for Iraq
and the Iraqi People’ issued at the Azores Summit
would:
“… require
a full, democratically elected government with control over
a
unified and
transparent budget, free from sanctions and integrated into
the
international
economy, pursuing a programme of sustainable economic growth
and
poverty
reduction.”
DFID’s aim
was:
“… to help
Iraq reach its development potential, to secure a stable future
where the
needs of
the whole population are met equitably and
sustainably.”
331.
The Interim
Strategy stated that, while the expected humanitarian crisis
had
not
materialised, four “immediate recovery tasks” needed to be
addressed in the next
three
months:
•
getting
public services running again, including by paying
salaries;
•
re-establishing
law and order, with Coalition support and using Iraqi
civilian
police
where available;
•
meeting the
needs of the vulnerable by maintaining the OFF food
distribution
system
beyond 3 June (with or without the OFF programme itself);
and
•
restoring
public infrastructure, including power and water supplies and
sanitation
and
sewerage systems.
332.
Drawing on
DFID’s experience in other post-conflict and transition countries,
and
given
Iraq’s characteristics as an oil-rich economy with a well-educated
population, DFID
would
consider support (but did not anticipate playing the leading role)
in four areas:
•
economic
management;
•
SSR;
•
public
administration reform; and
•
the
political transition process.
333.
DFID would
also help to ensure effective co-ordination of
international
development
assistance, including between ORHA, the IMF, the World Bank
and
the
UN.
334.
During the
six-month transitional period, DFID would need to establish a
small,
temporary
presence in Basra and a presence in Baghdad. Its presence
thereafter
would be
determined by “emerging needs” and the UK’s relationship with
the
Government
of Iraq. Given Iraq’s oil wealth and human capital, DFID’s
engagement was
likely to
be limited to about five years and focused on “strategic technical
assistance
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