6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

preparations were continuing to enable UK forces “to participate in military action should

that be required”.449

1150. Mr Hoon also assured the House that:

“… no military decisions whatsoever have been taken on military action against Iraq.

That situation will be reported to the House should it change.”

1151. Gen Reith told the Inquiry:

“I … briefed Geoff Hoon … early in the week that we had until Friday to go to

trade for ships; otherwise, we wouldn’t meet the window that the Americans were

potentially looking at before the real heat of the summer came in, in 2003. He said

to me ‘You have been telling me … week by week that we have to do this, and now

you are telling me you are giving me another deadline.’ I said, ‘this is the deadline’.

He said ‘You know, we need to keep our options open’ … I said ‘Well, actually if we

don’t go to trade by the end of this week, then we don’t have any options, we are

not going’. He then went to the Prime Minister and we were then authorised to go

to trade.”450

1152. On 10 December, Mr Johnson advised Mr Hoon on the options in the event of

an “ugly start” and land force options if Turkey did not agree to transit.451

1153. The land force options were:

• UK forces with the US main effort in the South;

• a follow‑on force after the US main effort in the South;

• ground forces only for the aftermath; and

• not providing ground forces at all.

1154. Mr Johnson advised that only the first option would provide “the sort of high profile

role in war‑fighting on the ground which we have previously judged important”.

1155. Mr Johnson also wrote that there were limits to what could be done to improve

readiness before a clear political decision. Calling out Reservists and deploying some

force elements and equipment as soon as they were available would start “to use up

some of our one‑shot capabilities”. That:

“… would cause us problems if it turned out that the campaign was not going to start

until later in the year. Deploying early also runs the risk of finding later that we are in

the wrong locations.”

449 House of Commons, Official Report, 9 December 2002, columns 13‑14.

450 Private hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 35‑36.

451 Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning – Briefing

for Meeting with Prime Minister on 11 December’.

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