The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
UN interim
administration, we should be prepared to be ‘lead nation’ for a
sector.
It would
be useful to discuss what this might mean in practice. A lead on
security
and willingness
to take a lead role in UN discussions?”
493.
The IPU
explained that there was “a slight difference” between MOD and
FCO
advice
being prepared for No.10. The FCO proposed that the UK should take
the lead
on security
in a sector “only if there is a UN interim administration”. The MOD
“appear
willing to
contemplate taking on a rather greater burden in a sector so long
as there
is a UN-authorised
Coalition/US administration”.
494.
The two
positions were reconciled in the joint briefing on post-conflict
UN
involvement
prepared by the IPU for Mr Blair’s conversation with President
Bush
on 19 February.
495.
In the paper
on sectorisation, prepared with input from UND and FCO
Legal
Advisers,
the IPU assumed that under any military plan UK forces would
secure
a “UK sector”
in southern Iraq. Four questions then arose:
“•
how long
should UK forces remain?
•
should
other UK civilians/administrators be in Iraq?
•
what should
be their task?
•
which area
should they be in?”
“•
from
occupying as small an area as possible (initial plans were for
around
1,600 sq km211
around
Basra and Umm Qasr) for as short a time as possible
(until we
can hand over to someone else, or simply withdraw without leaving
a
bloodbath)
•
to
occupying a large area of south-eastern Iraq and administering it
as an
occupying
power for perhaps 2-3 years, until an Iraqi administration takes
over.”
497.
The paper
listed four constraints on the UK approach to
sectorisation:
•
growing
debate about the legality of occupation the longer Coalition
Forces
remained in
Iraq without a UN mandate;
•
UK and US
interpretations of their responsibilities under international law
might
differ;
•
reduction
in UK force numbers “must begin by July/August, to achieve
reduction
to medium
scale by October/November”;
•
financing:
military costs alone would be £2.5bn. The paper asked: “MOD: is
this
known to
Treasury?”
211
The figure
of 1,600 sq km was used repeatedly in policy and briefing papers
during January and
February
2003. This was mistaken. It should have been approximately 16,000
sq km.
396