3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
•
Iraq had
progressively increased its international engagement and while
the
GRL might
make sanctions more sustainable, the sanctions regime
could
collapse in
the long term.
•
Those
states in breach of sanctions would want compensation.
•
Saddam
Hussein was only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he
believed
the threat
of large scale US military action was imminent; and that
such
concessions
would prevent the US from acting.
•
Saddam
Hussein was likely then to play for time, embarking on a renewed
policy
of
non-co-operation.
•
A “contract
with the Iraqi people” would need “some detailed work” to be “at
all
credible”.
272.
The US had
lost confidence in containment. Some in the US Administration
wanted
Saddam
Hussein removed. The success of Operation Enduring Freedom (the
US
military
operation in Afghanistan), distrust of UN sanctions and inspection
regimes, and
unfinished
business from 1991 were all identified as factors.
273.
The Cabinet
Office paper identified two possible types of future
regime
in Iraq:
•
a
government led by a Sunni military strongman; or
•
a Sunni-led
representative and broadly democratic government.
274.
The second
option would require the commitment of the US and
others
to nation-building
for many years.
275.
The paper
stated that the UK should consider what sort of Iraq it wanted.
It
identified
two possibilities:
•
A “Sunni
military strong man” who would be likely to maintain Iraqi
territorial
integrity.
That might allow military forces to “withdraw quickly”. While
outside
assistance
might be “traded” with assurances on WMD programmes and
respect
for human
rights, there would be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting
to
type with a
series of military coups until a Sunni dictator emerged who
protected
Sunni
interests and with time could acquire WMD.
•
A
“representative, broadly democratic government”, which would be
Sunni-led
but within
a federal structure which gave the Kurds guaranteed autonomy
and
the Shia
fair access to government. Such a government was judged to be
less
likely to
develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. But it would require the
US
and others
to commit to nation-building for many years and entail a
substantial
international
security force and help with reconstruction. The paper did
not
address how
a broadly representative government would not be
Shia-led.
435