6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
9.
At the
beginning of 2003, the US asked the UK to provide ground forces
in
the
South.
10.
Major General
Albert Whitley, Senior British Land Adviser and Deputy
Commanding
General
(Post Hostilities), told the Inquiry that, after General Tommy
Franks,
Commander
in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM), had decided not to
move
the US 4th
Infantry Division south, he had discussed with Lieutenant General
David
McKiernan,
Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC),
on
28 December 2002 whether it would be possible to use UK forces
in the South to
11.
On 5 January,
Brigadier Whitley prepared a paper for the Permanent
Joint
Headquarters
(PJHQ) on “the imperatives for timely decision making for the
commitment
of UK Land
Forces” to the US Operational Plan.3
12.
Brigadier
Whitley explained that uncertainties about whether Turkey would
allow
transit of
ground forces had led US and UK planners, on 28 December,
urgently
to
concentrate on developing robust operations from the south. He
recorded that
“even if
the UK were … granted transit through Turkey … the complexity and
scope
of the
problem … from a purely operational view point, would not be
welcomed”.
13.
Instead, Lt
Gen McKiernan “would welcome the commitment of a UK division in
the
South from
the start of the operation”. That would allow him to merge Phases
II and III of
the
campaign and both of the major subordinate US commands, V Corps and
1 Marine
Expeditionary
Force (1 MEF), to strike north fast. The UK mission would be to
“seize,
secure and
control” the rear area and right flank of the operation and provide
a coherent
transition
to Phase IV (post-conflict) operations in captured territory
without loss of US
combat
forces. That would include securing infrastructure such as Umm Qasr
and the
Rumaylah
oilfields, and fixing Iraqi forces in the Basra area. The UK Area
of Operations
(AO)4
was likely
to be bounded by the Iraq/Kuwait border, the US V Corps/1
MEF
boundary,
Jalibah air field and the Euphrates, an area about the same size as
Kuwait
(approximately
17,800 sq km).
14.
Brigadier
Whitley reported that the US saw the involvement of a UK division
in this
role as “so
important … they will do anything to assist within their power
providing there
is time to
do so”. In his view, that would allow the UK force to be “less
balanced in its
capability
than our doctrine and philosophy demand because the US will provide
key
support
particularly in fires and air defence”.
2
Statement,
25 January 2011, pages 6-7.
3
Paper Comd
SBLA, 5 January 2003, ‘Decision Imperatives’.
4
Definitions
and usage of the terms Area of Operations (AO) and Area of
Responsibility (AOR) are given
in Section
6.4.
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