9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
splitting,
fundamentally; with, of course, a series of structures, both
in terms of
provincial,
legislative structures and government structures, that could
command the
loyalty of
Iraqis and respected the authority of government.”78
157.
In a telephone
conversation on 29 August, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and
Mr Hadley
agreed that
the draft Constitution was a good document, but that the outcome
was “at
best mixed
in terms of bringing the Sunnis into the process”.79
They agreed
that the
possibility
of further changes should be kept open.
158.
Commenting on
the Constitution in conversation with Secretary Rice in
late
August 2005,
Mr Straw said that he was:
“… very
struck by the progress which had been made … The fact that the
decisions
on further
federalism had been parked to the new National Assembly … had
both
down and up
sides to it. The down side was that there was no built in
protection by
way of
special majorities or special processes for the Sunni to make more
difficult
greater
devolution of power which they feared. On the other hand, the fact
that this
question
was going to be left to simple majorities of the National Assembly
opened
up the
possibility for … deals by simple majority to provide some of the
protection
which the
Sunnis were seeking.”80
159.
Mr Patey
reported to Mr Asquith on 31 August that he had delivered
the
commitment
Secretary Rice had outlined to Mr Straw,
explaining:
“I … spoke
to Adel Abdel Mehdi to tell him that we could align ourselves with
US
assurances.
As you know, the UIA [United Iraqi Alliance] finally agreed that
[the]
issue of
further federalism would be left to the next National Assembly.
Adel has now
followed up
and asked for this in writing as promised.
“The US
assurances turned out to be in the form of a commitment to use
their
good
offices to hold the Kurds to a separate political agreement with
the UIA on the
content of
new legislation. I have provided a similar commitment
…
“In passing
our assurance on to Adel Abdel Mehdi, I have made it clear that
this
is not for
publication. This would make it more difficult to convince Sunnis
that the
issue of
future federalism was still open.”81
160.
The Red Team
established by Ambassador Khalilzad and Gen Casey in
July
reported at
the end of August.82
The team’s
objective had been to produce a strategy
aimed at
breaking the back of the insurgency within a year and defeating it
within three.
78
Private
hearing, 15 June 2010, page 13.
79
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 29 August 2005, ‘Conversation with US National
Security Adviser,
29 August’.
80
Letter
Straw to Sheinwald, 30 August 2005, ‘Conversation with US Secretary
of State, 29 August’.
81
Letter
Patey to Asquith, 31 August 2005, [untitled].
82
Report US
Red Team, 31 August 2005, ‘An integrated counterinsurgency strategy
for Iraq’.
515