The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
478.
Mr Hoon
attached “two large caveats” to all three options:
•
First, the
timescales were “best planning estimates” and made
“sweeping
assumptions”
about basing, transit routes and overflights. They also
assumed
that
funding would be available to improve sustainability and implement
UORs.
•
Secondly,
if the armed forces were required to provide 18,000‑20,000
people
for an
emergency fire service in the event of a nationwide firefighters’
strike
(Op FRESCO)
and the US started military action in winter 2002/3, only
the
in‑place
support package and Special Forces would be available.
479.
Mr Hoon
had commissioned further work with a view to expediting what
would
need to be
done once a decision in principle had been taken. UK
representatives at a
CENTCOM
planning meeting the following week would be instructed “to set our
options
positively
but without committing us to any specific ones”. The MOD would
write again
as soon as
there was “greater clarity about the US plan, such that the Chiefs
can update
their
assessment of it (and the risks involved) and the Defence Secretary
can make
recommendations
about the best option to pursue”.
480.
Copies of the
letter were sent to Mr Straw’s and the Cabinet Secretary’s
Private
Offices,
and to Mr Scarlett.
481.
The advice was
sent to Mr Blair on 31 July, as one of several “background
papers”
he had
commissioned at his meeting on 23 July “for summer
reading”.200
482.
Mr Rycroft
commented to Mr Blair:
“The
military are not yet ready to make a recommendation on which if any
of the
three
options to go for. Nor can they yet judge whether the US have a
winning
concept.
They are continuing to work with the US military. You do not need
to take
decisions
yet.”
483.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry that Mr Blair had said
that:
“… he
didn’t want to take any decision or accept any of these options. I
think in
retrospect
… this was because … this was the time … when we were pressing
for
the
Americans to consider the UN route. I think he didn’t want to give
any signal that
he was keen
to think about a military alternative …”201
484.
A minute from
Mr Hoon’s Private Office on 31 July stated:
“The
question of whether funds could be expended in preparation for an
operation
in Iraq
is being considered separately elsewhere.”202
200
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Background
Papers’.
201
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 36.
202
Minute
Watkins to Sec(O)1a, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq – Enhancements Required
for Possible
UK Contribution’.
248