The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1188.
The details of
the proposal were set out in a minute to Mr Hoon’s Private
Office
1189.
Mr Hoon
was advised that the ATG would “make a significant difference
to
the
viability of the US plan”. US ground operations were “now planned”
to begin
simultaneously
with the air campaign, and that a second point of disembarkation
was
required
“to enhance logistic flow and to prevent Iraqi destruction of key
oil production
and
distribution nodes”. That required the capture of Umm Qasr and the
al‑Faw
Peninsula
and the clearance of mines from the Khawr Abd Allah waterway. US
planning
for the
operation had “developed with UK input”, and was “well advanced”.
Unless the
role was
undertaken by the ATG, the US would have to “divert other forces,
at a cost
of several
days’ delay and increased risk”, including a “strategic delay” to
US follow‑on
operations
in Basra and crossing the Euphrates, and an increased risk of the
destruction
of oil
supplies.
1190.
Iraqi options
for defending the peninsula and hampering Coalition maritime
forces
included
land‑based anti‑ship missiles, some artillery and mortar
capability. An Iraqi
troop
presence of some 2,000‑3,000 could “in theory be reinforced by the
Iraqi 51st
Mechanised
Division based at az-Zubayr and al-Basra” but the US plan was
“designed
to prevent
such reinforcement being attempted”. If it were attempted,
“coalition forces
should be
able to defeat it with ease”.
1191.
Mr Hoon
was advised that the ATG would be “based around 40
Commando
Group
embarked in HMS Ocean, supported by HMS Ark Royal” and other ships.
The
force would
be commanded by a Royal Navy officer, “who would command both
the
amphibious
and MCM elements of the ATG”. It “was possible, subject to further
work”
that US
forces “could be placed under UK command”.
1192.
Mr Hoon
was also advised that:
•
“Previous
concerns that it might not be possible to support the ATG
concurrently
with other
elements of the UK force packages … have been assuaged.
Although
supporting
resources will be stretched, the stretch is judged to be
manageable.”
•
Further
work was “looking at the possibility of making a second RM
Commando
available
for follow‑on or aftermath operations”.
1193.
Mr Hoon
was asked to:
•
note that
the Chiefs of Staff had endorsed securing the al‑Faw Peninsula
and
mine
clearance operations as “a role for the ATG, judging that it would
be
consistent
with UK objectives and provide valuable strategic, operational
and
presentational
effect”; and
466
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq
Military Planning:
Amphibious
Task Group’.
354