The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

99. A JIC Assessment of 21 August concluded that in a conflict Saddam Hussein

would order missile strikes and the use of CBW against Coalition Forces,

supporting regional states and Israel.

100. The JIC had little intelligence on Iraq’s CBW and little insight into how

it would fight. Its conclusions reflected the Committee’s own judgements.

101. In relation to Saddam Hussein’s intentions to use CBW and missile strikes,

the sense of certainty that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and that it

would use them in the Key Judgements reflected a wider judgement than could

have been derived from the information in the Assessment itself.

102. At the request of the MOD, the JIC issued an Assessment on 21 August

considering “what diplomatic options Saddam has to deter, avert or limit the scope

of a US-led attack”.46 The judgements on these issues are set out in Section 3.4.

103. In addition, the Assessment considered Saddam Hussein’s “military options for

facing a US-led attack” and how his analysis about each course of action might “change

as an attack becomes increasingly imminent”. It examined Iraq’s options for the short

term, whether Saddam Hussein might seize the initiative, how Iraq might respond to

a US military build-up, Saddam’s options in “war” – including the use of missiles and

WMD, and “alternative scenarios and at the death”.

104. Iraq’s options for the use of weapons of mass destruction were considered “only

briefly” as the JIC would assess those in early September, but the JIC offered two

Key Judgements:

• “Early on in any conflict, Saddam would order missile attacks on Israel, Coalition

Forces and regional states providing the US with bases.”

• “Saddam would order the use of CBW against Coalition Forces at some point,

probably after a Coalition attack had begun. Once Saddam was convinced

that his fate was sealed, he would order the unrestrained use of CBW against

Coalition Forces, supporting regional states and Israel.”

105. The Assessment stated that “Saddam would probably order missile attacks” and

the JIC judged that attacks on Israel would be “an attempt to attract Israeli retaliation and

thus widen the war, split the Coalition and arouse popular opinion in the Arab States”.

Missiles “could be armed with chemical or biological warfare (CBW) agents”, although

“Saddam might be deterred at least initially by the threat of Israeli nuclear retaliation.”

46 JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options’.

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