The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
205.
On 12 October,
DOP(I) received a paper by officials on the medium-term
prospects
for Iraq,
which they said had reached a “critical juncture”. It reiterated
that the UK’s goal
for Iraq
was:
“A
democratic, stable, united and law‑abiding Iraq, within its present
borders,
co‑operating
with the international community, posing no threat to its
neighbours
or to
international security, abiding by all its international
obligations and providing
effective,
representative and inclusive government for all its
people.”127
206.
Officials
argued that the UK’s goal was “unlikely to be achieved”.
Officials
considered
that the best outcome that was likely to be achievable
was:
“… an Iraq
which can govern and sustain itself nationally and provincially,
and
where
sectarian and other violence is contained short of the point where
it would
overwhelm
Iraq’s institutions and precipitate chaos and/or civil
war.”
207.
The authors
suggested that achieving such an outcome lay “primarily in the
hands
of the
Iraqi Government” and that the ability of the UK to influence its
behaviour and
decisions
would continue to decline. The coalition’s current strategy of
“direct support
combined
with building Iraqi capacity” remained the only credible way to
influence
the
outcome. But they judged that, despite the coalition’s best
efforts, it was possible
that Iraq’s
institutions could be overwhelmed and Iraq would be threatened
with
fragmentation.
208.
The ability of
the Iraqi people to assume full responsibility for security and
sustain
any success
would be one crucial test. The officials recommended
that:
“… whilst
we should continue the process of withdrawing forces as we
progressively
handover
security responsibility to the Iraqi Government, we should
(assuming
continued
Iraqi Government consent) plan on a continuing UK military
commitment
focused on
SE Iraq for 2007 and at least part of 2008. Under current
agreed
coalition
plans this would involve a substantial combat force (unlikely to be
less than
4500
strong) capable of re‑intervention if required by the Iraqi
Government, and able
to carry
out a number of tasks on a routine basis. If at some point in 2007
or 2008
we were to
decide not to retain an in‑theatre capability to allow us to
re‑intervene
(on the
assumption that the Iraqi government would be unlikely to request
it) and
fulfil
other agreed tasks, force levels could be reduced further to closer
to 3,000. It
should be
noted, however, that these tasks are part of the UK’s agreed
commitments
to the
MNF‑I, and taking risk on any one of them could have serious
ramifications for
our
relations with the US.”
127
Paper
officials, 10 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Medium Term Prospects and
Implications’.
42