Executive
Summary
602.
As a junior
partner in the Coalition, the UK worked within a planning
framework
established
by the US. It had limited influence over a process dominated
increasingly
by the
US military.
603.
The creation
of the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq in September 2002 and the Iraq
Planning
Unit in
February 2003 improved co‑ordination across government at official
level, but
neither
body carried sufficient authority to establish a unified planning
process across
the four
principal departments involved – the FCO, the MOD, DFID and the
Treasury –
or between
military and civilian planners.
604.
Important
material, including in the DFID reviews of northern and southern
Iraq,
and
significant pieces of analysis, including the series of MOD
Strategic Planning
Group (SPG)
papers on military strategic thinking, were either not shared
outside the
originating
department, or, as appears to have been the case with the SPG
papers, were
not
routinely available to all those with a direct interest in the
contents.
605.
Some risks
were identified, but departmental ownership of those risks,
and
responsibility
for analysis and mitigation, were not clearly
established.
606.
When the need
to plan and prepare for the worst case was raised, including
by
MOD
officials in advice to Mr Hoon on 6 March
2003,214
Lieutenant
General John Reith,
Chief of
Joint Operations, in his paper for the Chiefs of Staff on 21
March215
and
in
Treasury
advice to Mr Brown on 24 March,216
there is no
evidence that any department
or
individual assumed ownership or was assigned responsibility for
analysis or
mitigation.
No action ensued.
607.
In April 2003,
Mr Blair set up the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
Rehabilitation
(AHMGIR),
chaired by Mr Straw, to oversee the UK contribution to
post‑conflict
reconstruction.
608.
Until the
creation of the AHMGIR, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Ms Short
remained
jointly
responsible for directing post‑conflict planning and
preparation.
609.
In the absence
of a single person responsible for overseeing all
aspects
of planning
and preparation, departments pursued complementary, but
separate,
objectives.
Gaps in UK capabilities were overlooked.
610.
The FCO, which
focused on policy‑making and negotiation, was not equipped
by
past
experience or practice, or by its limited human and financial
resources, to prepare
for
nation‑building of the scale required in Iraq, and did not expect
to do so.
214
Minute
Sec(O)4 to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Aftermath – Medium to Long
Term UK
Military Commitment’.
215
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 21 March 2003, ‘Phase IV Planning – Taking
Stock’.
216
Minute
Dodds to Chancellor, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution
to Post‑Conflict Iraq’.
81