12.1 | Security Sector Reform

537. In his response, Mr Bowen welcomed the deployment but said:

“… I find it odd that when we have discussed police training and the like at meetings

of officials and had been reassured that all is on track, this has not been challenged

at the time. It is not just the MOD who see the importance of police training, so do

we all. We must ensure that the information flow between departments is such that

messages we need to send to Washington or the CPA (or each other) are registered

before we reach crisis point … there is a clear role for senior officials to intervene if

programmes are going off the rails.”483

538. A further MOD force level review at the end of January 2004 considered SSR to be

“on track in MND(SE)”, although it did register problems with resourcing police training

and mentoring.484 It concluded that “given the right conditions” there would be no need

to replace the SSR battalion who were conducting ICDC training in July 2004 and added

that “assuming the security situation continues to stabilise” further reductions in force

levels might be possible by November 2004. Those recommendations were based on

assumptions that “consent of the population” would be “maintained” and that SSR would

continue “to deliver evermore capable and credible ISF”.

539. In early 2004, the focus in policing shifted from training to providing officers to act

as monitors/mentors, terms that appear to have been used interchangeably at the time.

Given the deteriorating security situation and the need for mentors to be out on the

ground, deploying police officers was problematic.485 As a consequence, that role had

been undertaken by the RMP.

540. Following a request from PJHQ to relieve the RMP, the FCO began considering

contracting around 40 UK retired officers.486 At the same time the US was developing

plans to recruit around 500 police advisers from Dyncorps to act as monitors/mentors,

with 50 being earmarked for the South. The UK’s seemingly unilateral approach was met

with some consternation by Mr Casteel, who reportedly said: “This isn’t two countries,

you know.”

541. Sir Nigel Sheinwald chaired a meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group on

13 February.487 Mr Dodd’s record of the meeting stated that the recent attacks in Erbil

showed that “terrorists felt threatened” by SSR. The US was focused on building the

ISF’s capacity, “with [General] Abizaid stressing quality over quantity”. While the US

planned to hand over security responsibility to Iraqi forces at a local level in July, US

Commanders “were not entirely confident they would have sufficient Iraqi forces … but

five months remained” to meet that deadline.

483 Letter Bowen to Lee, 22 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Police Support for MND(SE)’.

484 Paper CJO to PSO/CDS, 29 January 2004, ‘Op TELIC Force Level Review – Jan 04’.

485 Minute ISSU [junior official] to Buck and PS/Foreign Secretary, 3 March 2004, ‘Iraq – Contracting

of Police Monitors’.

486 Minute ISSU [junior official] to Buck, 4 February 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq 26‑30 Jan’.

487 Minute Dodd to Sheinwald, 16 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.

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