The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
954.
Mr Nick
McInnes, UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) Director International
Group,
briefed
UKTI colleagues on 3 May that there was growing pressure from the
British
Embassy
Baghdad and the MOD for a larger UKTI presence in
Baghdad.558
Their
arguments
for that were:
•
the
increased interest in Iraq from UK companies;
•
the
likelihood that Mr Brown’s economic initiatives would
stimulate further
interest;
and
•
the
possibility of sales of UK military equipment to Iraq.
955.
Section 10.3
describes the UK Government’s efforts to promote UK
businesses.
956.
In an
Assessment of 14 May, the JIC examined the impact of the Charge of
the
Knights on
JAM, Prime Minister Maliki, his Government and the
Sadrists.559
The
JIC’s
Key
Judgements included:
•
Prime
Minister Maliki was enjoying broad political support following the
success
of the
Charge.
•
The Charge
had significantly weakened JAM in Basra.
•
In Basra,
expectations were high. Prime Minister Maliki would need to
deliver
improvements
in public services and job creation “in weeks”.
957.
Mr Browne
visited Iraq briefly, on his way to Afghanistan, at the end of
May,
where he
“realised a personal ambition by having a cup of tea downtown”, the
result of
“a
remarkable transformation of the security
situation”.560
958.
A DFID
official briefed Mr Alexander on 30 May that, following
Mr Browne’s visit
to Iraq,
there were growing expectations among some military colleagues that
UK
civilians
would soon be able to travel “beyond the wire” (outside Basra Air
Station).561
Visits to
Basra Palace by PRT and DFID staff were currently being undertaken
at night,
by
helicopter, and were approved on a case-by-case basis. The
situation was not yet
good enough
to enable PRT and DFID staff to visit Iraqi Government offices on a
regular
basis, but
DFID would keep the situation under review.
959.
Ms Reid told
the Inquiry that shortly after the Charge of the Knights, Dr
al-Safi
agreed to
meet UK officials but not at the Basra Air Station:
“That
basically forced a decision … It [the meeting] was something that
was so
important …
there was so much pressure coming from Baghdad and from
London,
that we
need to go and have this discussion with him. And at that point …
authority
for me to
go went back to my Permanent Secretary to get the okay, because it
was
558
Email
McInnes to Haird, 3 May 2008, ‘Resourcing Commercial Work in
Iraq’.
559
JIC
Assessment, 14 May 2008, ‘Iraq: the Charge of the
Knights’.
560
Letter
Browne to Brown, 4 June 2008, ‘Visit to Basra’.
561
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State, 30 May 2008, ‘Iraq:
Ministerial Trilateral
Discussion,
2 June 2008’.
350