2 |
Decision-making within government
238.
The record of
the next meeting, on 21 February, described the co-ordinating
role
of the
AHGI:
“… the Ad
Hoc Group draws together work related to Iraq as
follows:
•
Work on
post-Saddam issues led by the Iraq Planning Unit. This
includes
the HMT [HM
Treasury]-led sub-group on economic and financial
issues;
•
Consular
planning; and
•
HMT/CCS
[Civil Contingencies Secretariat]-led domestic
contingency
planning
(the Stephens Group).
“AHGI
receives updates on military and intelligence issues, but these
issues
are handled
elsewhere. AHGI provides a forum for deciding how to cover
any
new
Iraq‑related issues. There is some read across from pre-existing
DTI and
HMT Whitehall
groups looking at oil.”137
239.
After
expressions of concern by Permanent Secretaries about the possible
impact
on the UK
of war in Iraq, Sir Andrew Turnbull had agreed in January 2003 that
the AHGI
should
conduct further work on domestic contingencies.138
240.
Mr Chilcott
told the Inquiry that, although numbers were small (“maybe
only
six, eight,
ten, for the first couple of weeks”), the IPU drew on expertise
elsewhere
in
Whitehall that allowed it to pull together a strategic
view.139
While
military planners
and PJHQ
were planning what was needed as troops occupied territory and
became
“responsible
… for the administration of where they were”, the IPU was “thinking
about
the
political process and the big issues about the development fund for
Iraq or oil policy
or what to
do about war criminals or the importance of legitimacy and legal
questions”.
241.
Asked how
influential the IPU had been, Mr Chilcott stated:
“… I don’t
think our main issue was having to convince other parts of
the
government
machinery that they should be doing things that they didn’t want to
do.
“I think we
were really synthesising the views and expertise across
government.
“Where we
needed to have clout … was in influencing the United States, and I
think,
there, we …
had no more clout than a sort of body of middle to senior ranking
British
officials
would have had with their American counterparts.”140
242.
Mr Chilcott
warned against being “dazzled” by the IPU’s late creation: “a lot
of
the work
that the IPU was able to bring together in a more intense
atmosphere had
137
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 25 February 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
138
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
139
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 7-8.
140
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 8-9.
305