The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
419.
When the
AHMGIR met on 2 October it did not discuss the draft Iraq
Strategy.245
Attendees
were provided with the, now populated, Short-Term Iraq Action
Plan.
420.
The Annotated
Agenda for those attending the meeting observed that:
“The new
UNSCR has lost momentum in the US administration with the
Pentagon
losing
enthusiasm and little pressure for decision from
Bremer.”246
421.
The new
resolution was unlikely to be passed until late October, shortly
before
a planned
Iraq Donors’ Conference, to be held in Madrid. The UK’s objective
for the
conference
was “to broaden international support for reconstruction in Iraq
and secure
the
necessary funding”.
422.
On 4 October,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that the CPA was developing
ideas
on how to
reach out to the Sunni population in Iraq.247
Mr Richmond
had been asked to
play a
leading role. Discussions at a senior level in CPA acknowledged
that it had not
spent much
effort on involving the Sunnis. There needed to be a comprehensive
political
strategy to
give them a stake in the process.
423.
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry that the CPA had consulted widely with
Sunni
community
leaders, and with Coalition commanders and CPA Co-ordinators in the
Sunni
governorates.248
They drew
up a programme with 30, 60 and 90 day targets covering
employment,
including recruitment into the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps, and
talked about
whether
de-Ba’athification could be made more flexible. They also discussed
trying to
reconnect
Sunnis with the political process.
424.
Sir David
concluded:
“… quite a
lot happened. Did it make a difference? Sadly not. This all
coincided with
the marked
increase in the insurgency towards the end of
October.”249
425.
Sir David said
he had been very concerned that there was “too much stick
and
not enough
carrot” and that aspects of the response to the Sunni insurgency
were not
well
handled. Getting the Sunni involved in the political process had
been extremely
difficult
because:
“… it
wasn’t possible to go to the Sunnis and say ‘Here is a political
process and your
part in
this is as follows. This is how you get involved and influence the
process’. We
were never
able to do that.”250
245
Minutes, 2
October 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
246 Annotated
Agenda, 2 October 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
247
Teleletter
Greenstock to Buck, 4 October 2003, ‘Sunni Outreach’.
248
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 52-58.
249
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, page 56.
250
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 57-58.
278