Executive
Summary
•
The level
of female representation in Iraq’s new political structures,
including the
25 percent
“goal” for members of the National Assembly set by the
Transitional
Administrative
Law, which the UK pursued with some success.
678.
In the absence
of decision‑making arrangements in which the UK had a
formal
role, too
much reliance was placed on communication between Mr Blair and
President
Bush, one
of the very small number of ways of influencing US policy. Some
issues were
addressed
by this route: for instance, using his regular conversations with
President
Bush,
Mr Blair was able, with some success, to urge caution in
relation to the US
operation
in Fallujah in April 2004.
679.
But the
channel of communication between Prime Minister and
President
should be reserved
for the most strategic and most intractable issues. It is
not
the right mechanism
for day‑to‑day policy‑making or an effective way of
making
tactical decisions.
680.
It is
impossible to say whether a greater and more formal UK input to
CPA
decisions
would have led to better outcomes. But it is clear that the UK’s
ability to
influence
decisions made by the CPA was not commensurate with its
responsibilities
as joint
Occupying Power.
681.
From early
June 2003, and throughout the summer, there were signs that
security
in both
Baghdad and the South was deteriorating. The MOD’s SPG warned that
“more
organised
opposition to the Coalition may be emerging”238
as
discontent about the
Coalition’s
failure to deliver a secure environment began to grow in the Iraqi
population.
682.
The extent of
the decline in Baghdad and central Iraq overshadowed the
decline
in
Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (MND(SE)). Food shortages and
the failure
of essential
services such as the supply of electricity and water, plus lack of
progress
in the
political process, however, began to erode the relationship between
UK forces
and the
local population. The deterioration was exemplified by attacks on
UK forces
in Majar
al‑Kabir in Maysan province on 22 and 24 June.
683.
As the summer
wore on, authoritative sources in the UK, such as the
JIC, began
to identify
issues with the potential to escalate into conflict and to
recognise the likelihood
that
extremist groups would become more co‑ordinated. The constraint
imposed on
reconstruction
activities by the lack of security began to be apparent.
Mr Sawers and
Sir David
Manning expressed concern about whether the UK had sufficient
troops
deployed in
MND(SE), and about the permeability of Maysan’s substantial
border
with Iran.
238
Minute
SECCOS to PSO/CDS, 10 June 2003, ‘OP COS Paper: UK Contribution to
Iraq: Strategic Intent
and
Direction’ attaching Paper SPG, 9 June 2003, ‘UK contribution to
Iraq: strategic intent and direction’.
93