The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
906.
Following a
discussion with Mr Blair, Mr Straw told Secretary Powell
that Mr Blair:
“… was
concerned that, having shifted world (and British) public opinion
over the
months, it
had now been seriously set back in recent days. We were not in the
right
position.
The Prime Minister was considering a number of ideas which he might
well
put to the
President.”282
907.
Mr Straw
recorded that Secretary Powell had advised that if Mr Blair
wanted
to make
proposals, he should do so quickly.
908.
Mr Straw
also recorded that the US was not enthusiastic about the inclusion
of
an immunity
clause for Saddam Hussein in the resolution. He had told Secretary
Powell
that Mr Blair
had thought that “might be seen as premature”; and that “if
necessary”
it might
be done “at the appropriate time in a separate
resolution”.
909.
Mr Straw
reported that he and Secretary Powell had discussed the
problems
in the UK.
Secretary Powell had told President Bush that he judged a vetoed
resolution
would no
longer be possible for the UK. Mr Straw said that he had been
told that, without
a second
resolution, only 100 Conservative MPs would vote with the
Government.
In those
circumstances, approval for military action would be “beyond
reach”.
910.
In the context
of a discussion about the lack of real serious US planning
for
post‑conflict,
the number of troops that might be required to secure the ground
behind
the US
advance to Baghdad, and the role envisaged for the UN,
Mr Straw recorded
that he
had told Secretary Powell that, “whilst the US Administration had
to be the best
judge of
its long term interests”, he “thought that it would reap a
whirlwind if it failed
to secure
legitimacy for what it was doing in respect of Iraq. We were not
there yet.”
911.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that Dr Blix continued to see
attractions
in the
Canadian proposal but was talking about a deadline of 1 May or 1
June.
912.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s report of discussions in New York on 3 March,
included:
•
Discussion
with the US delegation about:
{{US
thinking that a French veto would not severely undercut the
legitimacy
of military
action and Ambassador Negroponte’s “guess” that France
was
“talking up
the veto to deter us from putting the resolution to a
vote”.
{{Setting
Iraq a deadline for Iraq to be “unconditionally disarmed” by 17
or
21 March
with the UK suggesting a variant setting a deadline by which
Iraq
would have
“failed to take its final opportunity”.
•
In response
to a suggestion from Sir Jeremy Greenstock that it might
make
more sense
for UNMOVIC temporarily to withdraw before any vote on
a
resolution,
Dr Blix said he would discuss that with Mr Annan, but “he
would
not want
to be accused of playing to a minority in the
Council”.
282
Letter
Straw to Manning, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 3 March’.
344