12.1 | Security Sector Reform

There were also “unofficial” militias which were meant to be dismantled. Jaysh al‑Mahdi

(JAM) was judged to be “the most dangerous” of those. Mr Richmond commented that

dismantling militias was “Not an easy task as we have discovered”. He concluded his

report to London:

“It is easy to be sceptical about how quickly and effectively the militias will be

dismantled. There is an element of re‑badging in the agreed approach but it is

probably the only realistic way forward. A system which brings militia members within

the ambit of the state, if only nominally, is better than leaving the problem unresolved.

It is also an important confidence building measure. Ultimately, militias will only

disappear when the economy is strong enough to offer people higher paid jobs

elsewhere and the political system is sufficiently stable to remove their raison d’etre.”

On 7 June, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order No.91, entitled “Regulation of Armed

Forces and Militias within Iraq”.358 It prohibited the existence of armed forces and militias

other than those created by the CPA. Existing militia could remain only if they had a

“Transition and Reintegration” plan which included timescales for their disbandment

and a full list of members. Article 27 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and

subsequently Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibited armed forces or militias that

were not part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.359

An update to No.10 from the MOD in August 2004 stated: “The success of this

initiative will not only help generate stability in Iraq, but may serve as an example of

de‑militarisation in future conflicts.” 360

422. CPA Order No.68, in early April 2004, established the Ministerial Committee for

National Security (MCNS) and the position of National Security Adviser.361

423. The role of the MCNS was to facilitate and co‑ordinate national security policy

among the ministries and agencies of the Iraqi Government tasked with national security

decisions. It was to be the primary forum for ministerial‑level decision‑making on national

security issues and would comprise:

• Ambassador Bremer (Chair) until transfer of sovereignty, after which the Chair

would be the Prime Minister;

• Minister of Defence;

• Minister of the Interior;

• Minister for Foreign Affairs;

• Minister of Justice;

358 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91, 7 June 2004, ‘Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias

within Iraq’.

359 Report to Congress, 13 October 2005, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.

360 Minute Naworynsky to Phillipson, 20 August 2004, ‘Report from Lt Gen Petraeus, Multi‑National

Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC‑I) on developing the Iraqi Security Forces’.

361 Coalition Provisional Authority Order 68, 4 April 2004, ‘Ministerial Committee for National Security’.

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