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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
303.  The issue that Lord Goldsmith was addressing in his advice to Mr Blair was
not what the UK’s objective had been in negotiating resolution 1441 but its legal
effect in the circumstances of early 2003.
304.  Mr Blair referred again to this manuscript comment in his oral evidence when
recalling the No.10 meeting which had taken place on 17 October 2002, “which we then
minuted out, including to Peter”; and his meeting with Lord Goldsmith on 22 October 2002.
305.  Mr Blair said:
“… we had agreed on 17 October that there were clear objectives for the resolution
and those objectives were, I think we actually say this very plainly, the ultimatum
goes into 1441. If he breaches the ultimatum action follows. So this was the
instruction given. I mean, I can’t remember exactly what I said after the 22 October,
but I should imagine I said “Well, you had better make sure it does meet our
objectives …”116
306.  Mr Blair added:
“… the thing that was problematic for me throughout, and it is why I wrote … ‘I just
don’t understand this’ is that the whole point about our instructions to our negotiators
was, ‘Make sure that this resolution is sufficient because we can’t guarantee we are
going to go back into a further iteration of this or a second resolution’.”
307.  Mr Blair’s meeting on 17 October and the meeting between Lord Goldsmith and
Mr Blair on 22 October are described in Section 3.5.
US agreement to pursue a second resolution
308.  In the meeting on 31 January, President Bush agreed to support a second
resolution to help Mr Blair.
309.  A briefing paper prepared by the FCO Middle East Department on 30 January
described the objectives for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush as:
“to convince President Bush that:
our strategy, though working, needs more time;
the military campaign will be very shocking in many parts of the world, especially
in its opening phase (five times the bombing of the Gulf war);
a second UN Security Council resolution (i) would greatly strengthen the US’s
position, (ii) is politically essential for the UK, and almost certainly legally
essential as well;
116 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 55-56.
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