The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This section
describes:
•
how advice
was sought from Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General,
regarding
the
interpretation of UN Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and
the manner
in which
that advice was provided;
•
the events
and other influences that affected the timing of the
advice;
•
the written
advice provided by Lord Goldsmith in January 2003;
•
Lord
Goldsmith’s discussions with Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK
Permanent
Representative
to the UN in New York, in January 2003, his exchanges
with
Mr Jack
Straw, the Foreign Secretary, in early February, and his meeting
with
US lawyers
in February 2003;
•
Lord
Goldsmith’s written advice of 7 March 2003;
•
the legal
basis on which the UK ultimately decided to participate in military
action
against
Iraq; and
•
the
presentation of the Government’s legal position to Cabinet and to
Parliament
on 17 March
2003.
2.
Finally, this
section sets out the Inquiry’s conclusions regarding these events
and the
legal basis
on which the UK decided to participate in military action against
Iraq.
•
On 9 December,
formal “instructions” to provide advice were sent to Lord
Goldsmith.
They were
sent by the FCO on behalf of the FCO and the MOD as well as
No.10.
The
instructions made clear that Lord Goldsmith should not provide an
immediate
response.
•
Until 27
February, No.10 could not have been sure that Lord Goldsmith would
advise
that there
was a basis on which military action against Iraq could be taken in
the
absence of
a further decision of the Security Council.
•
Lord
Goldsmith’s formal advice of 7 March set out alternative
interpretations of
the legal
effect of resolution 1441. While Lord Goldsmith remained “of the
opinion
that the
safest legal course would be to secure a second resolution”, he
concluded
(paragraph
28) that “a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441
was
capable of
reviving the authorisation in resolution 678 without a further
resolution”.
•
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that a reasonable case did not mean that if the matter
ever
came to
court, he would be confident that the court would agree with this
view.
He judged
a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 required a further
Security
Council
decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution
678.
•
At a meeting
on 11 March, there was concern that the advice did not offer a
clear
indication
that military action would be lawful. Lord Goldsmith was asked,
after the
meeting, by
Admiral Boyce on behalf of the Armed Forces, and by the
Treasury
Solicitor,
Ms Juliet Wheldon, in respect of the Civil Service, to give a
clear-cut answer
on whether
military action would be lawful rather than unlawful.
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