15.1 | Civilian
personnel
96.
On 6 May,
Mr Straw announced to Parliament the appointment of
Mr John Sawers
as the
Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq (see Section 9.1).
Mr Straw
explained
that:
“Mr Sawers
will work alongside Chris Segar, head of the newly opened British
Office
in Baghdad,
particularly in relation to the political process and our work in
the Office
of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.” 64
97.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that, although he was “the senior Brit on
the
ground” he
was not Ambassador Bremer’s deputy, nor was he in the line
management
chain of
ORHA or the CPA. Rather, he was a representative of the British
Government
and so his
role was one of “exerting influence rather than exercising
power”.65
98.
By 14 May, the
UK had still not reached agreement with the US on ORHA
support
for UK
secondees.66
The IPU
explained to Mr Straw that:
“Since ORHA
deployed to Kuwait we have been trying to obtain assurances from
the
Americans …
about the precise terms on which our contribution is being
provided.
So far,
despite a good deal of pressing, we have not been successful
…”
99.
Deployment of
the additional secondees was delayed briefly by DFID
concerns
about
security.
100.
On 13 May,
Mr Suma Chakrabarti, DFID Permanent Secretary,
informed
Sir Michael
Jay that ORHA’s ‘Outline Brief for Potential International
Partners’ did not
cover
security issues adequately.67
The outline
committed the US military to provide
overall
security and evacuation arrangements, but “it does not set out any
security
procedures
or contingency plans, as we would normally require for any other UK
mission
in any
other country”.
101.
Mr Chakrabarti
explained that the contractors forming the bulk of the DFID
team
recruited
in response to Sir Michael Jay’s request for staff on 22
April, and due to travel
to Iraq the
next day, had said that their insurance cover would be invalid
until there was
an adequate
security plan. The existing DFID secondee to ORHA had therefore
been
put on
standby to withdraw if security arrangements were not resolved
quickly, and the
first two
additional secondees had been stood down. Mr Chakrabarti
proposed to send
a DFID
security team to Baghdad the next day and requested that an FCO
security
adviser
accompany them.
102.
Sir Michael
Jay responded the same day, after discussing the issue with the
UK
military,
Maj Gen Cross and Mr Sawers.68
Sir Michael
reported that Maj Gen Cross
64
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 May
2003, column 515.
65
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 56‑58.
66
Minute
Chatterton Dickson to Private Secretary [FCO], 14 May 2003, ‘Iraq:
ORHA: Security for UK
Secondees’
attaching Paper, ‘Iraq: Ad Hoc Ministerial Group, 15 May: ORHA
Secondees: Security’.
67
Letter
Chakrabarti to Jay, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Deployments to
ORHA’.
68
Letter Jay
to Chakrabarti, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Deployments to
ORHA’.
261