Previous page | Contents | Next page
4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
90.  It is not clear who attended the meeting as the record was not sent to participants.
91.  Mr McKane described the meeting to the Inquiry as a “throat clearing exercise”.37
92.  Reporting on a meeting on 22 August to update Sir David Manning on developments
concerning Iraq, Mr Tom Dodd, a junior official in OD Sec, wrote that the IISS would be
publishing “an academic dossier” on Iraqi WMD on 9 September:
“Officials have considered whether we should publish our own dossier in advance or
shortly afterwards. However they feel that the HMG dossier should only be published
in the context of Ministerial decisions on a policy change towards Iraq and as part of
a fully-fledged media campaign.”38
Revision of the WMD paper
93.  Mr Scarlett had been working on the WMD paper in the dossier during August.
94.  On 8 and 9 August, there was an email exchange between the Assessments Staff
and the MOD about whether there was evidence available on Iraq’s ballistic missile work
outside the activities permitted by the UN:
The MOD was asked if it could provide two to three “examples of ballistic missile
related sites” which were relevant to the claim that Iraq was breaking the limit
of 150km range permitted by the UN.39 Mr Scarlett was “keen” to include them
in the dossier. The MOD was also asked for “an explanation of the shed going
up at al-Rafah”, which Mr Scarlett also wanted to mention.
The MOD replied that it was not sure what it could provide but it would “see what
we can do”.40
In a subsequent email, the MOD stated that al-Rafah was a known engine test
site, which had been bombed in 1991 and December 1998.41 It was “no surprise”
that Iraq was putting “a lid on the new stand to prevent imagery observation of
test objects – the implication being that the stand is nearing completion and/or
there will be something to test on it”.
The MOD also commented: “You will recall that … we said that … points about
buildings being reconstructed … rely on inference and comparisons with what
they were trying to do before the Gulf War with BADR-2000. A big assembly
building does not automatically make large missiles … If the Chairman wants
37  Public hearing, 19 January 2011, page 79.
38  Minute Dodd to Manning, 23 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
39  Email [1525] [Assessments Staff junior official] to [MOD junior official], 8 August 2002, ‘Dossier –
missile sites’.
40  Email [1646] [MOD junior official] to [Assessments Staff junior official], 8 August 2002, ‘Re: Dossier –
missile sites’.
41  Email [1815] [MOD junior official] to [Assessments Staff junior official], 8 August 2002, ‘Re: Dossier –
missile sites’.
129
Previous page | Contents | Next page