6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
560.
On 18
February, in response to a request for advice for Mr Blair’s
discussion with
President
Bush the next day (see Section 3.7), Sir David Manning wrote that
there would
be a much
better chance of gaining support for the second
resolution:
•
if it was
clear that the UN would have a “key role” after any military action
and
that a
“massive humanitarian aid programme” would be instituted;
and
•
by
publishing and implementing the Road Map on Israel/Palestine before
any
military
action.
Sir David
advised Mr Blair that both points would be a “tough sell” with
President Bush,
but “both
are very important in helping us to win the
argument”.240
561.
Mr Blair
sent President Bush a six page Note on 19 February, reflecting
the
seriousness
of the UK’s concerns about the second resolution.241
The Note is
addressed
in detail
in Section 3.7.
562.
At the end of
the Note, Mr Blair offered “two further
thoughts”:
•
Publishing
the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) Road Map would
have
“a massive
impact”.
•
There was a
“need to start firming up the humanitarian work for the
aftermath
of the
conflict … and show how we will protect and improve the lives of
Iraqi
people”.
563.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by telephone on 19
February.242
564.
Before the
call, the FCO submitted the advice on key messages for use
with
President
Bush commissioned at Mr Blair’s meeting on 13
February.243
The
briefing
paper was
prepared by the IPU in collaboration with the MOD, the Treasury,
DFID and
the Cabinet
Office, and listed reasons for moving quickly to a UN interim
administration
operating
alongside a “robust Coalition military presence to ensure
security”.
“The
greater the degree of UN involvement, the greater our ability to
take part in
aftermath.
Without UN involvement, ongoing UK participation will be very
difficult –
real legal
and legitimacy problems.”
566.
The
conversation between Mr Blair and President Bush is described
in Section 3.7.
240
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 18 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Points for
Bush’.
241
Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
242
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime
Minister’s Telephone
Conversation
with Bush, 19 February’.
243
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq Day after: UN involvement’
attaching Paper FCO,
[undated],
‘Iraq Day After: UN Involvement’.
409