6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
US ground
operations would be synchronised as closely as possible with the
beginning
of air
operations, which it was judged would lead to the rapid collapse of
much potential
1262.
In addition,
the US was now thinking of “an information operation supported
by
manoeuvre,
rather than a manoeuvre operation supported by information
operation”.
Control of
Iraq’s oilfields (North and South), rather than control of Baghdad,
was seen
as the
strategic key to control of Iraq. It would prevent the Iraqi regime
from using oil
as a weapon
to cause a humanitarian and environmental catastrophe.
1263.
It would also
be essential to fund reconstruction. The US now recognised
that
stabilisation
and reconstruction of up to two thirds of Iraq would need to begin
before the
military
campaign had concluded. This was “bringing home to the US military
the need
for more
planning effort to be devoted to ‘aftermath’ issues
now”.
1264.
Copies of the
letter were sent to the Private Offices of Mr Straw and
Mr Brown,
and to
Mr Bowen.
1265.
The US plan
for a military campaign, including that the Coalition would not
fight
for Baghdad
in the initial phase of combat operations, is addressed in Section
8.
1266.
The MOD had
not yet reached a conclusion on the alternative options if
Turkey
refused
transit.
1267.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell that, in the light of reports about the
latest US
military
planning, the UK was “anxious about whether this was the right
approach”.484
1268.
In response to
a request for background material on US and UK military
thinking
and
preparations, Mr Watkins wrote to Sir David Manning on 20
December.485
1269.
Mr Watkins
highlighted “the continuing emphasis in US military planning
on
squeezing
every possible day out of their timelines, both in preparation for
and in the
prosecution
of any campaign”. As a result, the UK assumptions about detailed
timings
were
“potentially subject to acceleration at short notice”. Keeping
options open was:
“… likely
to require visible steps early in the New Year … including a first
call‑out of
reserves in
the first half of January and high profile maritime deployments
around
the middle
of the month.”
1270.
An early
conclusion on whether the UK could deploy through Turkey “and
thus
on the
shape of the UK land contribution” was also needed.
1271.
Mr Watkins
concluded that there would be “an increasingly pressing need
to
satisfy
ourselves that the US has an overarching political strategy with
which the
483
Letter
Williams to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Evolving US Military
Thinking’.
484
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Colin Powell, 19 December’.
485
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Christmas
Reading’.
363