The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

977. Mr Watkins reported that Mr Hoon judged that the UK should be “forward-leaning”

on the idea of extending the UK AO north during the conflict phase, “provided that UK

commanders judge this sensible in the circumstances at the time”.

978. Mr Watkins sent the letter to the Private Offices of Mr Straw and Mr Brown, and

to Mr Bowen, but not to DFID.

979. Mr Blair approved the plan on 14 March.422

980. The advice on which Mr Blair based his decision was incomplete.

981. Mr Hoon stated in January 2003 that credible plans for the aftermath were

needed before it could be concluded that the overall US plan represented a

“winning concept”, and that further work was needed on a satisfactory plan for

the aftermath before the UK committed forces to military action, but he failed to

press the point further with Mr Blair.

982. Mr Hoon’s advice to Mr Blair on military options in October 2002, on the

shift to the South and the deployment of UK forces in January 2003, and on

the expansion of the UK’s AO and AOR in March 2003, while recognising the

significance of the post-conflict phase, offered little analysis of wider, non-military

implications.

983. It was Sir Kevin Tebbit’s responsibility, as PUS, to ensure that military advice

from Adm Boyce to Mr Hoon was placed firmly in that wider context and reflected

broader analysis of the UK’s overall obligations, capabilities and strategic

objectives.

984. Lt Gen Reith was emphatic about the strategic significance of Phase IV in a paper

on the UK response to the “legal, security and humanitarian assistance demands of

Phase IVa” sent to the Chiefs of Staff on 11 March.423

985. In his covering minute, Lt Gen Reith informed the Chiefs of Staff that “legal

obligations placed on the UK as an Occupying Power will be extensive”. He advised:

“Phase IVa is likely to be the decisive phase of this campaign. This is recognised

by the US and considerable inter-agency planning effort has gone into creating

structures and providing resources to deal with anticipated security and

H[umanitarian] A[ssistance] issues; we can have confidence in these plans.

However, Phase IVa will not be the initial main effort; some political expectation

management may be required.”

422 Letter Manning to Watkins, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military Plan’.

423 Minute Reith to COSSEC, 11 March 2003, ‘Phase IVa – A UK Response’ attaching Paper Reith,

11 March 2003, ‘Phase IVa – A UK Response’.

488