4.4 | The
search for WMD
352.
The draft
concluded:
“We agree
that we need to take this investigation forward patiently and
prudently,
without
letting the media and the anti-intervention lobby rattle us. But we
have to
move fast
to secure the physical evidence of WMD and more importantly the
people,
the
scientists and administrators with the knowledge of the programmes,
before they
have time
to get together and work out a co-ordinated strategy for dealing
with us …
[and]
before they start taking their proliferation skills somewhere
else.”
353.
Following a
discussion with Mr Tenet on 11 June, Sir Richard Dearlove
sent him
the two
papers provided by Mr Cannon.169
Sir Richard
explained that SIS had made
arrangements
to reinforce and reorganise in Iraq to bridge the gap until the ISG
was
fully
operational. He also asked Mr Tenet for details of the new
command and control
arrangements
for the ISG so that decisions could be made on adjustments
needed
in the
UK.
354.
Mr Tenet
announced Dr Kay’s appointment as “Special Advisor for
Strategy
regarding
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (commonly known as
the
Head of
the ISG) on 11 June 2003.170
355.
In his memoir,
Mr Tenet wrote:
“Military
personnel would have to do the lion’s share of the actual searching
and
provide
almost all of the physical security for those engaging in the
mission. To
get around
that hurdle, we carefully negotiated a memorandum of
understanding
with DOD,
spelling out how a senior advisor appointed by me would work
with,
but not
command, what was called the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which
would
stay technically
under the command of a two-star general reporting to
the
Secretary of
Defense.”171
356.
Mr Tenet
also wrote:
“Our
instructions to Kay were simple. Find the truth. We promised him
the resources
he needed
and an absence of interference from the home front. I am confident
that
we
delivered both.”
357.
Mr Tenet
added, “We protected Kay’s independence fiercely.”
358.
Senior US, UK
and Australian military officers and civilians involved with the
ISG
took part
in weekly video conferences linking Baghdad with capital
cities.172
Participants
included
Secretary Rumsfeld’s Office, CENTCOM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the DIA, the
US
intelligence office in Baghdad, and UK and Australian
intelligence.
169
Letter
Dearlove to Tenet, 12 June 2003, [untitled].
170
CIA News
& Information, 11 June 2003, DCI Tenet
Announces Appointment of David Kay as Special
Advisor.
171
Tenet G
& Harlow B. At the
Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA.
HarperPress, 2007.
172
Duelfer
C. Hide and
Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public
Affairs, 2009.
491