The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

91. The Iraq Senior Officials Group on 27 August was told that:

“… we should not assume the problems with Muqtada Al Sadr (MAS) and his

militias had been solved. In particular, there was no way of enforcing their

agreement to disarm.” 44

92. In response to the 20 August commission from Mr Blair’s Private Secretary, the

IPU provided a paper on 27 August which contained “little new in policy terms”.45

93. The paper concluded that the strategy agreed by DOP in July remained the right

one but would need regular fine tuning.

94. Drawing on a letter from Mr Alan Charlton, British Chargé d’Affaires Washington,

the IPU also advised that President Bush was “letting US officials in Baghdad make the

running” and that the UK should focus its effort with the President on a few issues where

Washington could make a difference, specifically:

• keeping the elections on course;

• IIG outreach to the regions;

• ensuring that the US did not take reconstruction in the South for granted; and

• Security Sector Reform.

95. The IPU paper also included a description of the key risks, including:

• continued security problems;

• preparations for elections falling further behind schedule and pressure from the

IIG to postpone them; and

• lack of communications support for the IIG.

96. The Private Secretary’s covering minute to Mr Blair suggested that the IPU’s

paper was “too vague”, did not reflect the deteriorating security situation in Basra and

elsewhere and did not offer a clear way forward.46 He recalled that Mr Blair had asked

for the “unvarnished truth so that we can engage in a frank discussion about how we can

help the IIG restore control”.

97. After discussing the paper with Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Antony Phillipson

(Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs) recommended that a new paper should

be commissioned, broken into three sections:

• how to ensure that the elections took place, on time, in January 2005;

• how the Sunni triangle could be brought “back under control”; and

• how order could be restored in Basra.

44 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Jack, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials Group’.

45 Submission Crompton to Private Secretary [FCO], 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’ attaching Paper

Iraq Policy Unit, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’ and Letter Charlton to Phillipson, 24 August 2004, ‘Iraq’.

46 Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’.

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