6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
principles
set out in a mandate provided by the Security
Council.604
If the
Iraqi regime
fought to
the end or the damage to Iraq was extensive, the international
administration
would need
to assume control of key areas.
1385.
The importance
of a “structural analysis of the Iraqi system and the need
for
reform” was
one of seven key judgements in the 6 November edition of the SPG
paper
on
strategic military thinking, which stated that current FCO and DFID
papers had
revealed
“key gaps in our knowledge”.605
1386.
The SPG stated
that a “balance must be struck between the competing
demands
for reform
and removal of Ba’athist influence and the need for effective
administration”.
There
needed to be a “detailed structural analysis of the current regime,
its instruments
of state
power and its administration”.
1387.
Mr Drummond,
a member of the UK delegation to the talks on
post-conflict
issues in
Washington on 6 November, made a similar point to Sir David
Manning.606
He
reported
that, where the UK assumed the Iraqi Government would need “radical
reform”,
including
removal of “the pervasive influence of the Ba’ath Party”, the US
believed
“reasonably
competent ministries” remained beneath permanent secretary level
and
that,
because the Ba’ath Party operated as a parallel structure to
government below that
level,
“less radical change is needed”. Mr Drummond suggested that
both the UK and
US
Governments would need to develop and test their thinking more
thoroughly.
1388.
At
Mr Blair’s seminar with academics on 19 November, points made
in discussion
included
that there would be difficult decisions on the extent of
co-operation with existing
structures,
including the Ba’ath Party. Views differed on whether the Ba’ath
Party would
survive
Saddam Hussein’s downfall.607
1389.
The FCO paper
on interim administrations, shared with the US on 12
December,
stated:
“… Iraq has
a reputation for being one of the better-run Arab countries with
a
well-educated
civil service. But we have little first hand evidence of how
things
work nowadays.
We need more information …”608
1390.
Officials were
reported to be working with academics, the Iraqi exile
community
and
diplomatic posts to tackle a number of questions, including: “To
what extent are
ministries
infiltrated by Ba’athist elements? How central are the Ba’athists
to the
functioning
of the ministries? Can the ministries work without
them?”
604
Letter Gray
to Drummond, 18 October 2002, ‘Papers for the AHGI’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
17 October
2002, ‘International Administration for Iraq: what, who and
how?’
605
Paper
[SPG], 6 November 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
606
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 8 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
607
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 20 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
seminar with academics,
19 November’.
608
Paper
Middle East Department, 12 December 2002, ‘Interim Administrations
in Iraq: Why a UN-led
Interim
Administration would be in the US interest’.
555