9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

485. By 23 October, Mr Sawers was beginning to doubt that credible elections

producing a good result, based on a legitimate Constitution, would be possible during

the course of 2004 because of the length of time it was likely to take to produce a

legitimate Constitution.273

486. Mr Sawers indicated in a letter to Mr Simon Webb, MOD Policy Director, that he

had begun some new work on the political process in Iraq. The conclusion was that the

UK should avoid its forces continuing as occupiers with a Bremer-type figure in control

beyond 2004.

487. There was a case for a provisional government, with executive powers and full

sovereignty, to provide more time in which to draw up a full Constitution. A provisional

assembly would be chosen either by full elections or some form of indirect elections.

FCO legal advice was that an interim Constitution would not be needed.

488. Mr Sawers set out how a provisional government could be stood up in six months:

• October: CPA begins discussions with the GC about possible formation of

a Provisional Assembly, into which the GC and other institutions would be

subsumed.

• 15 December: GC reports to UN Security Council and sets out a preference

for a Provisional Assembly to last two years to allow time for drawing up a new

Constitution.

• End January: UN Security Council agrees new resolution allowing the CPA three

months for orderly handover.

• April/May 2004: Provisional Assembly inaugurated. CPA comes to an end.

• April/May 2004 to April May 2005: new Constitution drafted.

• April 2005: referendum on draft Constitution.

• Summer 2005: elections held, and internationally recognised Iraqi Government

formed.

489. On 24 October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock supplied Mr Sawers with comments on his

proposals. He explained:

“I agree that it is unlikely that, during the course of 2004, we will obtain both a

permanent Constitution and the holding of credible elections. One or other is going

to have to give.”274

490. Sir Jeremy did not think it necessary to complete a permanent Constitution before

elections were held. Ambassador Bremer, however, felt that it was “the job of the

273 Letter Sawers to Webb, 23 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’ attaching Paper IPU, October 2003,

‘Iraq: Political Process: Possible Creation of a Provisional Government’.

274 Minute Greenstock to Sawers, 24 October 2003 ‘Iraq Political Process’.

287