Executive
Summary
639.
Before the
invasion, the JIC and the DIS had each identified that there was a
risk
of
lawlessness breaking out in Iraq, and that it would be important to
deal with it swiftly.
Others,
including Mr Blair, Sir Kevin Tebbit and the Iraq Policy
Unit, had recognised the
seriousness
of that risk.
640.
However, the
formal authorisation for action in Iraq issued by Adm Boyce
on
18 March
contained no instruction on how to establish a safe and secure
environment if
lawlessness
broke out as anticipated. Although it was known that Phase IV would
begin
quickly, no
Rules of Engagement for that phase, including for dealing with
lawlessness,
were
created and promulgated before UK troops entered the
country.
641.
Both before
and during the invasion Lt Gen Reith made the absence of
instructions
to UK
forces covering what to do if faced with lawless behaviour by the
Iraqi population
in Basra
explicit to the Chiefs of Staff.
642.
Faced with
widespread looting after the invasion, and without instructions,
UK
commanders
had to make their own judgements about what to do. Brigadier
Graham
Binns,
commanding the 7 Armoured Brigade which had taken Basra City, told
the Inquiry
that he had
concluded that “the best way to stop looting was just to get to a
point where
there was
nothing left to loot”.229
643.
Although the
implementation of tactical plans to deal with lawlessness was
properly
the
responsibility of in‑theatre commanders, it was the responsibility
of the Chief of the
Defence
Staff and the Chief of Joint Operations to ensure that appropriate
Rules of
Engagement
were set, and preparations made, to equip commanders on the ground
to
deal with
it effectively. They should have ensured that those steps were
taken.
644.
The impact of
looting was felt primarily by the Iraqi population rather than
by
Coalition
Forces. The latter initially experienced a “honeymoon
period”,230
although
the situation
was far from stabilised.
645.
Lt
Gen Reith anticipated that UK forces could be reduced to a
medium scale
effort by
the autumn, when he expected the campaign to have reached “some
form
646.
The JIC
correctly judged on 16 April that the local population had high
hopes that
the
Coalition would rapidly improve their lives and that “resentment of
the Coalition ...
could grow
quickly if it is seen to be ineffective, either politically or
militarily. Such
resentment
could lead to violence.”232
229
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 11.
230
Public
hearing Walker, 1 February 2010, page 16.
231
Minute
Reith to SECCOS, 14 April 2003, ‘Phase 4: Roulement/Recovery of UK
Forces’ attaching Paper
CJO, 14
April 2003, ‘Phase 4 ‑ Roulement/Recovery of UK Land
Forces’.
232
JIC
Assessment, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: The Initial Landscape
Post‑Saddam’.
87