The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Intelligence
on Iraqi WMD was “difficult to obtain and to verify”.
•
“Little of the
intelligence is, however, sufficiently clear to identify the exact
status
and
ultimate objectives of these programmes. Intelligence is clearest
on Iraq’s
missile
facilities and associated activities.”
•
“Because of
the need for raw materials and components from abroad,
sanctions
remain an
obstacle to the development of all Iraq’s WMD
programmes.”
Iraq’s
ballistic missile programme
•
There was
“reliable
intelligence of Iraq’s current short range ballistic
missile
programmes” and “a
growing body of evidence that Iraq intends to develop
missiles
well beyond its permitted range of 150km”. That “would
represent a
step
change in
Saddam Hussein’s military capabilities”.
•
“An injection
of an additional [US]$20 million and political pressure from
Saddam
Hussein”
appeared “to have accelerated
progress over the past year”.
That
included:
––
“work
on extending the
range of the Al Samoud missile to 200-300km –
production
could start within the year”;
––
“work on
a further
missile engine test stand with the capacity for much
larger engines
than the Al Samoud, including SCUD”;
––
the
intelligence was “less clear on longer term missile
objectives”;
––
“… tests on
pairs of solid propellant motor cases. These are at a very
early
stage of
development, but if combined
in a missile, they
could have a
range of up
to 2,000km
with a
500kg payload. Developed individually into
missiles,
using the same payload, they could achieve a range of
between
700-1,200km.”
•
The JIC
assessed that both the Al Samoud and its extended range version
“could
deliver a
conventional, chemical or biological warhead”.
•
The JIC did
“not
know the location
of some 20 reassembled 650km range
Al Hussein
missiles”.
•
“Apart from
the construction of a large test stand”, there was
“nothing to
indicate
plans to
produce new SCUD type missiles”.
•
The JIC did
“not know enough about the possible 2,000km range missile to
judge
a timescale
for its completion”.
Chemical
warfare programmes
•
The JIC had
“good intelligence of Iraq’s former
CW associated facilities”;
intelligence
of “other related CW
activity, including possible weaponisation”
was
“less
clear”.
•
The JIC did
“not know the location of pre-Gulf War CW related stocks or
where
Iraq may
have filled weapons. Such stocks would enable Iraq to use its
chemical
industry
to produce
significant amounts of mustard gas within weeks of
a
decision to
do so, and nerve
agents within months.”
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