The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the UK to
gain an early footprint on the ground, providing influence in
theatre and
achieving
strategic impact.”
If the
collapse happened after more than 60 days, the UK land component
would have
reached
full operating capability and would deal with the
situation.
1256.
Maj Gen Fry
advised that, in order to provide a quick response, the
stabilisation
force was
“likely to be light” and its role limited to “wider peacekeeping
and ‘stabilisation’
tasks”.
Those included controlling and denying access to WMD, security at
key
locations,
disarmament and demobilisation. The paper set out a number of
options
for different
scenarios.
1257.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting, Lt Gen Reith commented that any
stabilisation
force would
depend on timing and availability of resources, and that there was
a synergy
between the
southern option and a stabilisation force.
1258.
The minutes of
the Chiefs of Staff meeting included a “Post Meeting
Note”
stating
that the commitment to Operation FRESCO might be reduced by “some
2,000
personnel”,
and:
•
The option
recommended by Lt Gen Reith was not the preferred
northern option,
and a force
package based on two UK high readiness brigades, each with
three
battlegroups,
should be developed further, with the aim of providing a
second
manoeuvre
“element”, within a manpower ceiling of about 33,000.
•
Options for
enhancing the Amphibious Task Group, and additional options
for
the South
which would consider the utility of a second light brigade and
the
deployment
of follow‑on forces, should also be developed.482
1259.
The MOD
provided an update on the military thinking for No.10
on
19 December
and further background material the following day.
1260.
No.10 was
informed that:
•
Control of
Iraq’s oilfields rather than control of Baghdad was seen as
the
strategic
key to the control of Iraq.
•
Keeping
options open was likely to require visible steps early in
the
New Year,
including call‑out of Reserves and high profile
maritime
deployments.
•
An early
conclusion on whether the UK could deploy through Turkey
was
needed to
define the land option.
1261.
In response to
a request for an update on US military thinking, Mr Hoon’s
Private
Office
wrote to Sir David Manning on 19 December to inform him that
the beginning of
482
Minutes, 18
December 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
362