3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
agreed on
the importance of sending a strong signal” to the countries
identified as part
of an “axis
of evil” that their behaviour needed to change.8
21.
FCO
officials advised Mr Straw that, while the immediate US focus was
on
getting a
revised Goods Review List agreed by the deadline of 30 May, the
signs
were that
the US would pursue regime change. Pressing for implementation of
a
tougher
inspections regime could offer a potential alternative to military
action.
If Saddam
Hussein failed to co-operate there would be a stronger
justification for
military
action.
22.
Reporting on
talks the previous week with the US, including progress in US
talks
with
Russia, Mr William Patey, Head of the FCO Middle East Department,
advised
Mr Straw
that:
“In the
absence of any decisions on wider Iraq policy and the post-11
September
situation,
the immediate US focus is on getting the Goods Review List (GRL)
agreed
23.
Mr Patey also
described clarification of resolution 1284 (1999) as “anathema
to
the US”. It
feared that would represent “a slippery slope towards a weaker
inspections
regime”.
Mr Patey added:
“As for the
wider policy all the signs point to the US going for a regime
change
option. But
there does not appear to be a viable plan as yet and the time
frame
remains
uncertain. Cheney [Vice President Dick Cheney] is due to tour the
Middle
East in
mid-March and we would be surprised if any decisions were taken
before
then. We
have asked Washington for a further read-out of US thinking beyond
State
Department.”
24.
Reporting on
talks with a senior French official, Mr Patey wrote that his
reading of
US
intentions was “the same as ours”. That appeared “to have produced
a change in
French
attitudes towards [resolution] 1284 and the prospects of
clarification”. Security
Council
“agreement on a tough inspections regime with unconditional access”
was seen
“as the
only realistic alternative to US military action”. The talks with
French officials are
addressed
in more detail later in this Section.
“If we can
get agreement on a tough regime, this would represent a
no-lose
situation.
If the Iraqis continue to resist a tough inspections regime or let
the
inspectors
in then renege, the justification for any military action would be
much
stronger.
If, against all expectations, UNMOVIC were allowed to do their job
this
would offer
the best prospect of dealing with Saddam’s WMD.”
8
Letter
[Private Secretary No.10] to McDonald, 6 February 2002, ‘Telephone
conversation with
US President’.
9
Minute
Patey to Goulty and PS [FCS], 12 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
391