The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
87.
In his
bilateral discussion with President Bush, Mr Blair assessed
that there
was a need
to be ready for military action early in the New Year, as soon
as
possible
after it was clear that there was a material breach. The chance of
Saddam
Hussein
co‑operating was no higher than 20 percent.
88.
Mr Blair
confirmed that the UK would provide military support if
that
was necessary.
89.
In preparation
for the bilateral discussion with President Bush at the NATO
Summit
in Prague,
Sir David Manning suggested that the points Mr Blair
might cover on Iraq
included:
“We are
well placed after … 1441. International community behind us. If we
are
patient,
and let Saddam make mistakes, they will stay there. We must work
together
to help
Blix/UNMOVIC. We should avoid being trapped into tight definition
of what
would
constitute material breach – keep our options
open.”26
90.
Mr Alistair
Campbell, Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy,
wrote in
his diaries
that he had been told by Mr Dan Bartlett, President Bush’s
Communications
Director,
at dinner on 20 November that the US view was that it was “seventy
to thirty
that there
would be war, but that thirty was genuine”.27
They had
also discussed the
need to
“set up a proper operation in Qatar, not least to have people to
make an impact
on Al
Jazeera”.
91.
Sir David
Manning reported that, during the lunch for Heads of State
and
Government,
President Bush had emphasised that resolution 1441 was
about
disarmament,
not inspections.28
As
Mr Blair had said at the earlier plenary
discussion,
that was
not a game of hide and seek. Saddam Hussein must co‑operate. There
would
be very
severe consequences if he didn’t.
92.
President Bush
added that Mr Blair had made the excellent point that the
greater
our resolve
appeared to be, the greater the chances that the current crisis
could be
resolved
peacefully. Saddam Hussein must be under no illusion that if he did
not disarm,
an
international coalition would do the job for him. President Bush
had emphasised that
he very
much wanted the UN route to work and that he was grateful for the
support he
had
received.
93.
Sir David
reported that there had been “wide support” for President
Bush’s
intervention.
The Prime Ministers of Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Portugal
and
26
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 20 November 2002, ‘Prague Summit: Bush
Bilateral’.
27
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to
Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
28
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 21 November 2002, ‘NATO Prague Summit: Lunch
for Heads of State
and Government’.
20