3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
36.
Sir David
argued that the US and UK “should be ready to oblige if what they
wanted
was another
ten days, or the end of the month”. That would be:
“… a small
price to pay for securing the nine votes that were needed if UK
forces
were to
participate in military action, and if we were to be sure that the
Prime
Minister
could survive a vote in the House of Commons. Obviously these
were
our
priorities … It did not make sense to give the military timetable
precedence
over the
political realities … I could not believe that the military
planning could
not be
massaged to allow more time if there was a chance that this would
make
the difference.”
37.
Sir David
commented that he had:
“… laid it
on the line this evening. I left Condi [Dr Rice] in no doubt
about our political
difficulties;
and … that the Administration should be ready to make concessions
on
test/benchmarks
and on timing if that was what it took to get nine votes
…”
38.
The timing of
the vote on a second a resolution and for a Parliamentary
debate
in the UK,
and the potential difficulties of securing nine votes in the
Security Council
and a
majority in Parliament, were discussed in a subsequent conference
call between
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, Mr Campbell and Sir
David Manning and
39.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell wrote that the White House had said
that:
“… if we
got a majority with vetoes, Bush wanted to go straight in, within
days, even
short of
the March 17 deadline, would say the UN had failed to act, and get
going,
on the
basis of 1441. We made the point that we needed a second
resolution.
Without it
we had real problems in Parliament. They said continually that
they
wanted to
help us but of course what they really wanted was the use of our
forces.
“Jonathan
and I continually emphasised we needed the second resolution.
We
had seven
definite votes still, but Condi was less confident re Chile and
Mexico …
They [the
US] basically wanted by Tuesday/Wednesday to say we had
exhausted
every
effort and now the diplomatic window had closed. We said that if we
got the
majority
for a second resolution, even with vetoes we would have to go
through
with it,
including the timetable. Andy Card [President Bush’s Chief of
Staff] said he
feared the
President’s response would be ‘Here we go, another final
opportunity, a
final final
opportunity and this time we really mean it.’ I said TB’s job was
on the line
and we did
not want to lose him. ‘No, nor do we’, said Condi. I think our
concern was
13
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 9 March 2003, ‘Iraq: US/UK Conference Call, 9
March’.
14
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
407