3.6 | Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

definition set out in OP4. There had been plenty of material breaches in the past

which had not led to military action. But, as UNSCR 1441 set out, if there were a

further material breach then Iraq would face serious consequences. This could only

mean military action.”

785. Mr de Villepin responded that, as politicians, he and Mr Straw had to show how

military action corresponded to the threat. The issue of material breach had to be faced.

786. Mr Straw countered that “just because the international community was not taking

action against other states was not an argument for inaction against Iraq”; and taking

action against Iraq “would be a deterrent to other countries”. In his view it would be

“possible to avoid military action only if the international community remained united

in telling Iraq to comply”.

787. In the second conversation, Mr de Villepin expressed surprise about the joint

article signed by eight European Prime Ministers which Mr Blair had not mentioned

to President Chirac.262

788. Mr Straw told Mr de Villepin that at the time resolution 1441 was agreed, “everyone

knew that a further material breach would trigger a meeting of the Security Council”.

Mr de Villepin did not agree with Mr Straw’s view that Iraq “had committed a further

material breach”. Mr Straw argued that resolution 1441 had:

“… agreed a 60‑day inspection period. Blix had then reported. There would be

further discussions in the Security Council. If Iraq changed its behaviour, then good.

If not, military action would become inevitable …”

789. Mr de Villepin had stated that France would never be placed in a position where

it would agree to a second resolution simply as window dressing for military action; it

wanted time to allow the build‑up of pressure to work. The US timeframe was too short.

790. Mr Straw said:

“… the more the inspectors found a pattern of non‑compliance, the greater the

suspicion surrounding Saddam’s WMD …

“It would be terrible if, in the case of a clear further material breach, the international

community did nothing. It was in no one’s interest to see the US act unilaterally.

That would mean the international community losing influence over US actions.”

791. When Mr Straw asked whether France would consider using its veto, Mr de Villepin

“ducked the question”.

262 Telegram 23 FCO London to Paris, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Second Conversation

with French Foreign Minister, 29 January’.

141