4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
community”.51
The “Iraqi
regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its
capabilities
in the
field of chemical and biological weapons” and that “we now know
that Saddam
has resumed
his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons … Many of us are convinced
that
Saddam will
acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.”
115.
Vice President
Cheney added that there was “no doubt” that Saddam
Hussein
had weapons
of mass destruction and was “amassing them to use against our
friends,
against our
allies, and against us”.
116.
In a telephone
call on 29 August, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed
Iraq,
including
the need to make clear that Iraq was the UN’s problem and that the
issue was
total
disarmament of Iraq’s WMD and associated systems not just the
reintroduction of
“… wanted
the UN to meet that challenge, but if it could not we would have to
act.
So we
should remake the case, put together the evidence against Saddam,
and
work up a
UNSCR [UN Security Council resolution] …”
117.
When
Mr Blair returned to No.10 after his holiday, he set out his
concerns
about the
public debate, and that he and President Bush had been “outed”
as
having
decided on military action when no decisions had been
taken.
118.
As part of a
wider note to No.10 officials on 30 August about the strategy on
Iraq,
Mr Blair
set out his position:
“I don’t
need any convincing as to where we are on this. The state of
opinion, the
difficulties.
The problems are compounded by the fact that [President] Bush
and
myself have
been ‘outed’ as having decided for war, come what may, when
actually
no
decisions have been taken. So the arguments are all being made
against any
action,
when we are not yet in a position to make the arguments for it. But
all this
can be
turned round in time, with the right strategy.
“My basic
view on Iraq is clear and hard. The policy of containment … has
worked
up to a
point, but can’t continue indefinitely; there is no doubt that,
uncontained,
Iraq is a
threat; they are trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability; they
are
developing
ballistic missile capability for biological and chemical weapons of
a
longer-range;
they retain substantial WMD stocks …
“Opinion
against action divides into two: those always opposed and the
usual
anti-American
lobby; and those, a large number, who ask entirely
sensible
questions,
but who might support action if the questions were
answered.”53
51
The White
House, 26 August 2002, Vice
President Speaks at VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars]
103rd National
Convention.
52
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Bush,
29 August’.
53
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 30 August 2002, [extract
‘Iraq’].
135