The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
151.
The Cabinet
Office could not confirm the origin of the document but it appears
to
be the Note
referred to by Mr Campbell and has manuscript additions in
Mr Blair’s hand.
152.
The document
comprised a series of headings with very short bullet
points,
including
“Aftermath Questions”:
•
What would
happen immediately, “a new Iraqi government or US
run?”
•
What type
of Iraqi government would be the aim in the medium
term?
153.
Mr Blair
raised aftermath planning issues with President Bush and Dr Rice
in
Washington
on 31 January.82
154.
Mr Blair
was told that detailed planning on humanitarian issues was
progressing
well, but a
dilemma remained over how to handle the transition to civil
administration and
what sort
of Iraqi government should emerge. Mr Blair suggested that a
UN badge was
needed for
what the US and UK wanted to do, and would help with the
humanitarian
problems.
155.
The minutes of
the 3 February FCO Iraq Morning Meeting stated that the
talks
between
Mr Blair and President Bush had not focused on day after
issues and that the
MOD had
“flagged up the urgent need for progress on the key
questions”.83
156.
Mr Blair’s
comments to President Bush did not convey the full extent of
UK
concerns
about the state of post-conflict planning.
157.
Section 6.4
explains that Mr Hoon had advised Mr Blair on 16 January
that:
•
“a
satisfactory plan for the aftermath” was needed before any decision
to
use UK
forces deployed to the region; and
•
a US
political decision on military action could be taken in
mid-February,
with
operations beginning in mid-March.84
158.
By 31
January, time was running out to ensure that, before the
conflict
began,
there was an agreed US/UK plan for the post-conflict administration
and
reconstruction
of Iraq.
159.
Mr Blair’s
conversation with President Bush represented a missed
opportunity
to exert pressure on the US to add necessary impetus to that
task.
82
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush
on 31
January’.
83
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 3 February 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
84
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
338