The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
717.
Dr Marsden
commented that it was important to acknowledge that the UK did
not
have a
sufficiently clear picture of Basrawi politics and their connection
to Baghdadi
politics to
be confident that any plan was credible.
718.
The MOD sent
No.10 a report on the effects of Op SINBAD on 16 February,
as
background
material for Mr Blair’s statement to the House of Commons the
following
week.410
It
concluded that “quick impact projects, short-term employment, and
the
demolition
of the Jameat police building” had improved consent levels and
provided
an opportunity
to make progress towards PIC.
719.
MND(SE) had
spent US$77m on quick impact projects during Op
SINBAD,
generating
25,000 short-term jobs. Those economic results had not been
decisive;
many of the
economic problems in southern Iraq stemmed from a lack of national
and
Provincial
Government capacity to prioritise and spend resources:
“The
Provincial Council need to start leading and delivering projects
for decisive
and sustained
economic effect to be felt.”
720.
Mr Blair
told the House of Commons on 21 February that the UK hoped
that
Maysan
could be transferred to full Iraqi control “in the next few
months”, and Basra
in the
second half of 2007.411
The
transfer of security responsibility would result in a
reduction
in the level of UK forces from 7,100 to roughly 5,500. With the
exception of
those
troops which would remain at Basra Palace, UK forces would be based
at the BAS
and be in a
support role.
721.
At the end of
February, at Mr McDonald’s request, Dr Marsden produced a
second
report on
life for ordinary Iraqis in Basra.412
722.
Drawing on
over 100 interviews carried out in and around Basra by a member
of
the PRT,
poll data and other sources, she reported that life was “still
grim”. Violence and
lawlessness
were Basrawis’ overwhelming concern. Women were increasingly afraid
to
leave the
house, fearing kidnap, harassment or sexual violence. Many had been
forced
to give up
their jobs. The police were not trusted, with many interviewees
telling stories
of
intimidation, kidnapping and death squads.
723.
Support for
the national Government and Prime Minister Maliki was high,
support
for the
Provincial Government low. Local politicians were seen as corrupt,
unqualified
and linked
to militias. No interviewee was able to give an example of
something that
the
Provincial Government had done to improve the lives of ordinary
people. After
security,
unemployment was the most commonly cited concern: polling indicated
that
some
30 percent of Basrawis were employed. Few interviewees saw any
improvements
in basic
services: what work had been done was of poor quality. Most
Basrawis had
410
Letter
Beadle to Banner, 16 February 2007, ‘The Effects of Op
SINBAD 20
September 2006 to
14 January
2007’.
411
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 21
February 2007, columns 261-280.
412
Letter
Marsden to McDonald, 28 February 2007, ‘Basra: everyday life for
ordinary Iraqis’.
312