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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
717.  Dr Marsden commented that it was important to acknowledge that the UK did not
have a sufficiently clear picture of Basrawi politics and their connection to Baghdadi
politics to be confident that any plan was credible.
718.  The MOD sent No.10 a report on the effects of Op SINBAD on 16 February, as
background material for Mr Blair’s statement to the House of Commons the following
week.410 It concluded that “quick impact projects, short-term employment, and the
demolition of the Jameat police building” had improved consent levels and provided
an opportunity to make progress towards PIC.
719.  MND(SE) had spent US$77m on quick impact projects during Op SINBAD,
generating 25,000 short-term jobs. Those economic results had not been decisive;
many of the economic problems in southern Iraq stemmed from a lack of national and
Provincial Government capacity to prioritise and spend resources:
“The Provincial Council need to start leading and delivering projects for decisive
and sustained economic effect to be felt.”
720.  Mr Blair told the House of Commons on 21 February that the UK hoped that
Maysan could be transferred to full Iraqi control “in the next few months”, and Basra
in the second half of 2007.411 The transfer of security responsibility would result in a
reduction in the level of UK forces from 7,100 to roughly 5,500. With the exception of
those troops which would remain at Basra Palace, UK forces would be based at the BAS
and be in a support role.
721.  At the end of February, at Mr McDonald’s request, Dr Marsden produced a second
report on life for ordinary Iraqis in Basra.412
722.  Drawing on over 100 interviews carried out in and around Basra by a member of
the PRT, poll data and other sources, she reported that life was “still grim”. Violence and
lawlessness were Basrawis’ overwhelming concern. Women were increasingly afraid to
leave the house, fearing kidnap, harassment or sexual violence. Many had been forced
to give up their jobs. The police were not trusted, with many interviewees telling stories
of intimidation, kidnapping and death squads.
723.  Support for the national Government and Prime Minister Maliki was high, support
for the Provincial Government low. Local politicians were seen as corrupt, unqualified
and linked to militias. No interviewee was able to give an example of something that
the Provincial Government had done to improve the lives of ordinary people. After
security, unemployment was the most commonly cited concern: polling indicated that
some 30 percent of Basrawis were employed. Few interviewees saw any improvements
in basic services: what work had been done was of poor quality. Most Basrawis had
410  Letter Beadle to Banner, 16 February 2007, ‘The Effects of Op SINBAD 20 September 2006 to
14 January 2007’.
411  House of Commons, Official Report, 21 February 2007, columns 261-280.
412  Letter Marsden to McDonald, 28 February 2007, ‘Basra: everyday life for ordinary Iraqis’.
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