The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
861.
Sir
Christopher advised that this was the least the UK should do. He
had been
advised by
Mr James A Baker III, the former US Secretary of State, to put down
a
marker with
the Administration fast.
862.
Sir David
Manning raised oil and gas contracts with Dr Rice in Washington
on
9
December.420
He hoped UK
energy companies “would be treated fairly and not
overlooked
if Saddam left the scene”. Dr Rice commented that it would be
particularly
unjust if
companies that had observed sanctions since 1991, a category which
included
UK
companies, were not among the beneficiaries of post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq.
863.
UK and US
policies on Iraqi oil and efforts to secure contracts for UK
companies
hoping to
do business in Iraq are described in Section 6.5.
864.
In
November, the UK received a formal US request for UK military
support in
Iraq,
including for post-conflict operations.
865.
Lt Gen
Reith submitted four proposals for the deployment of UK forces to
the
Chiefs of
Staff, one for the North and three for the South.
866.
The Inquiry
has not seen any detailed analysis underpinning Lt Gen
Reith’s
conclusion
that the South of Iraq would be more manageable in the
post-conflict
period than
the North.
867.
Adm Boyce
directed that the North should remain the focus of UK
planners
at that
time.
868.
On 18
November, Mr Hoon’s office informed No.10, the Cabinet Office,
the
FCO and Sir
Christopher Meyer that Mr Hoon had received a formal US request
for
UK
assistance with a military campaign in Iraq (see Section 6.1),
including provision
of
“financial/material resources for a military campaign and for
post-conflict efforts”
and
“constabulary forces and humanitarian assistance as part of
post-conflict stability
869.
Lt Gen Reith
submitted a paper to the Chiefs of Staff on 18 November setting
out
northern
and southern options for a UK land contribution in Iraq (see
Section 6.1).422
He advised
the Chiefs to think about “where we wish to be at the end of Phase
III
[combat
operations], as this could impact directly on any UK involvement in
Phase IV”.
420
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
421
Letter
Williams to McDonald, 18 November 2002, ‘Iraq – US request for UK
support’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
15 November 2002, ‘Request for UK Support’.
422
Minute
Reith to DCDS(C), 18 November 2002, ‘Options for the UK Land
Contribution’ attaching Paper
CJO, 18
November 2002, ‘Options for the UK Land Contribution’.
258